| Neidhart v K.T. Brake & Spring Co. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 08304 [55 AD3d 887] |
| October 28, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| John J. Neidhart et al., Respondents, v K.T. Brake & SpringCompany, Defendant and Second Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, and Hub Truck Rental Corp.,Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff. Bruedan Corporation, Third-Party Defendant/Second Third-PartyDefendant-Appellant; Fairway Golf Car Company, Second Third-PartyDefendant-Appellant. |
—[*1] Ahmuty, Demers & McManus, Albertson, N.Y. (Brendan T. Fitzpatrick of counsel), forthird-party defendant/second third-party defendant-appellant and second third-partydefendant-appellant. Siben & Ferber, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Steven B. Ferber and David M. Schwarz of counsel), forrespondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant and second third-partyplaintiff, K.T. Brake & Spring Supply, Inc., sued herein as K.T. Brake & Spring Company, appeals, aslimited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Doyle, J.), datedFebruary 15, 2007, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar asasserted against it, and the third-party defendant/second third-party defendant, Bruedan Corporation,and the second third-party defendant, Fairway Golf Car Company, separately appeal from so much ofthe same order as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the second third-partycomplaint.[*2]
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill ofcosts payable by the respondents to the defendant and second third-party plaintiff-appellant, thethird-party defendant/second third-party defendant-appellant, and the second third-partydefendant-appellant appearing separately and filing separate briefs, and the motions for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant K.T. Brake & SpringSupply, Inc., sued herein as K.T. Brake & Spring Company, and dismissing the second third-partycomplaint are granted.
The injured plaintiff was driving a tractor-trailer which veered off the roadway and struck a tree.He has no recollection of how the accident occurred. The impact of the collision caused the trailer todetach and crash into the tractor cab. At the time of the accident, the injured plaintiff was employed asa driver by Bruedan Corporation (hereinafter Bruedan) and the Fairway Golf Car Company(hereinafter Fairway). Bruedan owned the trailer involved in the accident, and leased the tractor fromanother entity. The injured plaintiff and his wife subsequently commenced this action against, amongothers, K.T. Brake & Spring Supply, Inc., sued herein as K.T. Brake & Spring Company (hereinafterK.T. Brake), which had performed a New York State motor vehicle inspection of the tractor-trailerapproximately eight months prior to the accident, claiming that it had negligently failed to detect that thekingpin device which attached the trailer to the tractor cab was cracked and rusted. K.T. Brakethereafter commenced a second third-party action against Bruedan and Fairway. After discovery hadbeen conducted, K.T. Brake moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as assertedagainst it, and Bruedan and Fairway moved for summary judgment dismissing the second third-partycomplaint. The Supreme Court denied the motions. We reverse.
Since a finding of negligence must be based on the breach of a duty, "a threshold question in tortcases is whether the alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to the injured party" (Espinal v MelvilleSnow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 138 [2002]; see Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d 781, 785[1976]; Chahales v Westchester Joint Water Works, 47 AD3d 610 [2008]). "Without a dutyrunning directly to the injured person there can be no liability in damages, however careless the conductor foreseeable the harm" (Lauer v City of New York, 95 NY2d 95, 100 [2000]). Theexistence and scope of a duty is a question of law which requires the balancing of public policyconsiderations (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 138 [2002]). Recently, inStiver v Good & Fair Carting & Moving,Inc. (9 NY3d 253 [2007]), the Court of Appeals held, as a matter of public policy, that theoperator of a New York State motor vehicle inspection station did not owe a duty of care to a thirdparty outside the inspection contract who was injured as a result of an allegedly negligent inspection. Inthis regard, the Stiver Court stated that "[i]f New York State motor vehicle inspection stationsbecome subject to liability for failure to detect safety-related problems in inspected cars, they would beturned into insurers. This transformation would increase their liability insurance premiums, and themodest cost of a State-mandated safety and emission inspection . . . would inevitablyincrease" (id. at 257-258). Here, as in Stiver, the plaintiffs' claim is similarly predicatedon the failure to detect an alleged safety defect during a State-mandated inspection. Accordingly, wefind, as a matter of law, that K.T. Brake owed no duty of care to the injured plaintiff, and that K.T.Brake's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it shouldhave been granted.
In light of our determination that K.T. Brake was entitled to summary judgment, K.T. Brake'ssecond third-party action against Bruedan and Fairway also should have been dismissed. Rivera, J.P.,Lifson, Miller and Eng, JJ., concur.