| Palma v Sherman |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 08307 [55 AD3d 891] |
| October 28, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Christopher Palma et al., Respondents, v Marsha L. Sherman etal., Appellants. |
—[*1] Stock & Carr, Mineola, N.Y. (Victor A. Carr and Thomas J. Stock of counsel), forrespondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Baisley, J.), dated April 7, 2008, which denied their motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
The plaintiff Christopher Palma, when 15 years old, allegedly was injured when a bicycle he wasriding came into contact with a vehicle owned by the defendant Marsha Sherman and driven by thedefendant Jillian Sherman. The contact occurred near the front passenger-side headlight. Christopher'sfather, the plaintiff Richard Palma, commenced this action on behalf of his infant child and individually torecover damages for personal injuries. The Supreme Court denied the defendants' motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint. We reverse.
With few exceptions not relevant in this case, a person riding a bicycle on a roadway is entitled toall of the rights and bears all of the responsibilities of a driver of a motor vehicle (see Vehicleand Traffic Law § 1231; Rosenberg vKotsek, 41 AD3d 573 [2007]; Redcross v State of New York, 241 AD2d 787[1997]). In general, a motorist is required to keep a reasonably vigilant lookout for bicyclists, to soundthe vehicle's horn when a reasonably prudent person would do so in order to warn a bicyclist ofdanger, and to operate the vehicle with reasonable care to avoid colliding with [*2]anyone on the road. A bicyclist is required to use reasonable care for hisor her own safety, to keep a reasonably vigilant lookout for vehicles, and to avoid placing himself orherself in a dangerous position (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146; Rosenberg v Kotsek, 41 AD3d 573[2007]; Trzepacz v Jara, 11 AD3d531 [2004]; Redcross v State of New York, 241 AD2d 787 [1997]; PJI 2:76A). Each isrequired to obey the statutes governing traffic and is entitled to assume that the other also will do so (see Rosenberg v Kotsek, 41 AD3d573 [2007]; Trzepacz v Jara, 11AD3d 531 [2004]; Redcross v State of New York, 241 AD2d 787 [1997]; PJI 2:76A).Here, the defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law byestablishing that the contact occurred when Christopher attempted to enter the parking lot in violation ofJillian Sherman's right of way, at a speed too great for the conditions, while the vehicle was stoppedand waiting to exit the parking lot, and that the contact occurred in such a manner that Jillian Shermanwas unable to either warn Christopher or avoid the contact. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise atriable issue of fact. The defendants' vehicle merely furnished the occasion or condition for thehappening of the accident (see Ely v Pierce, 302 AD2d 489 [2003]). Thus, the defendants'motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted. Santucci, J.P., Dillon,Dickerson and Chambers, JJ., concur.