| People v Randall-Whitaker |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 08348 [55 AD3d 931] |
| October 28, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v VirginiaRandall-Whitaker, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Seth M. Lieberman ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrus, J.),rendered April 17, 2006, convicting her of hindering prosecution in the first degree and tampering withphysical evidence, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment astime-barred pursuant to CPL 30.10 (2) (b). The defendant was properly charged with hinderingprosecution in the first degree and tampering with physical evidence under a continuing crime theory(see People v Shack, 86 NY2d 529, 540-541 [1995]; People v Rosich, 170 AD2d703 [1991]). Hindering prosecution and tampering with physical evidence are crimes that, by theirnature, may be committed either by one act or by multiple acts and readily permit characterization ascontinuing offenses over a period of time (see People v Keindl, 68 NY2d 410, 421 [1986];People v DeBeer, 35 AD3d 1275 [2006]). In view of the continuing nature of the crimes, thestatute of limitations did not begin to run until the offenses had terminated (see People v DeBeer,35 AD3d 1275 [2006]; People v Eastern Ambulance Serv., 106 AD2d 867 [1984]).Since this prosecution was commenced within five years of the termination of the crimes as charged, itwas timely (see CPL 30.10 [2] [b]; People v Knobel, 259 AD2d 499 [1999]).
The defendant's failure to base her speedy trial motion on the specific contentions that she nowadvances on appeal renders these contentions unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL470.05 [2]; People v Sease, 305 AD2d 700 [2003]). In any event, upon reviewing the record,we find that [*2]the total time chargeable to the People was less thanthe six-month time period provided by CPL 30.30 (1) (a). Accordingly, the motion was properlydenied.
The defendant's contention that the People failed to establish her guilt by legally sufficient evidenceis unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Payne, 3 NY3d266, 280 [2004]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]). In any event, viewing the evidencein the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621[1983]), and giving the People the benefit of every reasonable inference which could be drawn from thecircumstantial evidence adduced (see People v Lewis, 64 NY2d 1111, 1112 [1985];People v Way, 59 NY2d 361, 365 [1983]), the evidence was legally sufficient to establish thedefendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (seePeople v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Florio, J.P., Angiolillo, McCarthy andChambers, JJ., concur.