| Kutner v Catterson |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 08461 [56 AD3d 437] |
| November 5, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Stephen D. Kutner et al., Respondents, v Jean Catterson,Appellant. |
—[*1] Kutner & Gurlides, Mineola, N.Y. (Stephen D. Kutner, pro se, of counsel),plaintiff-respondent pro se and for plaintiff-respondent Stephen D. Kutner. Chesney & Murphy, LLP, Baldwin, N.Y. (Tara A. LaBella of counsel), for counterclaimdefendants-respondents.
In an action to recover unpaid legal fees, the defendant counterclaim plaintiff appeals froman order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCarty, J.), entered September 27, 2007, whichdenied her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and on her counterclaim.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
This action to recover unpaid legal fees arises from the representation by the plaintiffscounterclaim defendants (hereinafter the plaintiffs) of the defendant counterclaim plaintiff(hereinafter the defendant) in a matrimonial action. The Supreme Court denied the defendant'smotion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and on her counterclaim alleging legalmalpractice, finding that triable issues of fact existed. We affirm.
To sustain a cause of action alleging legal malpractice, a plaintiff must establish that theattorney "failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed bya member of the legal profession," and that the attorney's breach of this duty proximately causedthe plaintiff actual and ascertainable damages (Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker &Sauer, [*2]8 NY3d 438, 442 [2007] [internal quotation marksomitted]; see Hearst v Hearst, 50AD3d 959, 963 [2008]; Bauza vLivington, 40 AD3d 791, 792-793 [2007]; Magnacoustics, Inc. v Ostrolenk, Faber,Gerb & Soffen, 303 AD2d 561, 562 [2003]). "To establish causation, a plaintiff must showthat he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action or would not have incurred anydamages, but for the lawyer's negligence" (Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker &Sauer, 8 NY3d at 442; see Davis v Klein, 88 NY2d 1008, 1009-1010 [1996]; Barnett v Schwartz, 47 AD3d 197,203-204 [2007]). A settlement of an underlying claim does not preclude a subsequent action forlegal malpractice where the settlement was effectively compelled by the mistakes of counsel(see N.A. Kerson Co. v Shayne, Dachs, Weiss, Kolbrenner, Levy & Levine, 45 NY2d730, 732 [1978], affg on Suozzi, J., concurring op, 59 AD2d 551, 552 [1977]; Tortura v Sullivan Papain Block McGrath& Cannavo, P.C., 21 AD3d 1082, 1083 [2005]; Rau v Borenkoff, 262 AD2d388, 389 [1999]; U.S. Ice Cream Corp. v Bizar, 240 AD2d 654, 655 [1997];Lattimore v Bergman, 224 AD2d 497 [1996]).
Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that triable issues of fact exist precludingsummary disposition in favor of the defendant. Although the defendant's allegations may belegally sufficient to support her counterclaim alleging legal malpractice (see Gaslow vPhillips Nizer Benjamin Krim & Ballon, 286 AD2d 703, 705 [2001]; Rapp v Lauer,200 AD2d 726 [1994]; cf. Ippolito v McCormack, Damiani, Lowe & Mellon, 265 AD2d303 [1999]; Ostriker v Taylor, Atkins & Ostrow, 258 AD2d 572 [1999]), the plaintiffsraised a triable issue of fact as to the appropriateness of their actions as measured against the"ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legalprofession" (Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d at 442 [internalquotation marks omitted]; see Hearst v Hearst, 50 AD3d at 963).
We decline the plaintiffs' request to impose a sanction upon the defendant for pursuing anallegedly frivolous appeal (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1). Fisher, J.P., Balkin, McCarthy andChambers, JJ., concur.