| Matter of Devontay M. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 08740 [56 AD3d 561] |
| November 12, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Devontay M., a Child Alleged to be Neglected.Administration for Children's Services, Respondent; Dina J. et al., Appellants. (Proceeding No.1.) In the Matter of Devontaya M., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Administration forChildren's Services, Respondent; Dina J. et al., Appellants. (Proceeding No.2.) |
—[*1] Dawn M. Shammas, Jamaica, N.Y., for appellant Devon M. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Leonard Koerner and PamelaSeider Dolgow of counsel), for respondent. Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Susan Clement of counsel), attorneyfor the children.
In two related child protective proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, themother appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of fact-finding of the FamilyCourt, Richmond County (McElrath, J.), dated February 1, 2007, as, after a fact-finding hearing,found that she derivatively neglected the children Devontay M. and Devontaya M. and the fatherseparately appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of the same order, as, after a fact-findinghearing, found that he derivatively neglected the children Devontay M. and Devontaya M.[*2]
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs ordisbursements.
Contrary to the mother's contention, because the mother's use of excessive corporalpunishment as to the children Devon M. and Devonique M. (see Family Ct Act §1012 [f] [i] [B]; § 1046 [b] [i]; see also Matter of Derek J., 56 AD3d 558 [2008] [decided herewith]) demonstrated a fundamental defect in her understanding of parentalduties relating to the care of children, there was sufficient evidence to make a finding ofderivative neglect as to Devontay M. and Devontaya M. (see Family Ct Act § 1046[a] [i]; see also Matter of Joshua R.,47 AD3d 465 [2008]; Matter ofJasmine A., 18 AD3d 546 [2005]; Matter of Christina Maria C., 89 AD2d 855[1982]).
Further, as to the father, the credible evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing establishedthat he placed the children in imminent risk of harm by the mother (see Family Ct Act§ 1012 [f] [i] [B]; Matter of KaylaW., 47 AD3d 571 [2008]; Matter of Joseph O., 28 AD3d 562 [2006]; Matter of Rakim W., 17 AD3d376 [2005]). The father was aware of the mother's use of excessive corporal punishment onthe children Devon M. and Devonique M. Further, an order of protection barred the mother'scontact with the children, except for visitation sanctioned by the Administration for Children'sServices, yet the father allowed her to have access to them. Since the father's judgmentdemonstrated a fundamental defect in his understanding of parental duties relating to the care ofchildren, there was sufficient evidence to make a finding of derivative neglect as to Devontay M.and Devontaya M. (see Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [i]; Matter of Jasmine A., 18 AD3d546 [2005]; Matter of Christina Maria C., 89 AD2d 855 [1982]).
The father's remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly before us. Skelos,J.P., Fisher, Dickerson and Belen, JJ., concur.