| Matter of Imani Elizabeth W. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 08973 [56 AD3d 318] |
| November 18, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| In the Matter of Imani Elizabeth W., a Child Alleged to bePermanently Neglected. Benny William W., Appellant; McMahon Services for Children,Respondent, et al., Respondent. |
—[*1] Joseph T. Gatti, New York, for McMahon Services for Children, respondent. Karen Freedman, Lawyers for Children, Inc., New York (Betsy Kramer of counsel), LawGuardian.
Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Sarah P. Schechter, J.), entered on or about August 1,2007, which, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, terminated respondent-appellantfather's parental rights to the subject child on the ground of permanent neglect and committedcustody of the child to petitioner and the Commissioner of the Administration for Children'sServices of the City of New York for the purpose of adoption, unanimously affirmed, withoutcosts.
Petitioner demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child was "permanentlyneglected" within the meaning of Social Services Law § 384-b (7) (a). We rejectappellant's contention that petitioner failed to make diligent efforts to strengthen and encouragethe parent-child relationship (see § 384-b [7] [f]). To the contrary, petitionerworked with appellant to formulate a service plan, which included anger management anddomestic violence programs, a parenting skills class, remaining drug free, submitting topsychological and psychiatric evaluations, maintaining a stable household, regular visitation withthe child, and planning for her future apart from appellant's teenage girlfriend. Petitioner madethe appropriate referrals for appellant, who completed portions of the service plan, as well as theanger management, domestic violence and parenting skills programs, and remained drug free tothe extent that his visits with the child were improved to unsupervised and overnight at his home.Petitioner worked with appellant as to what would be required to assure the child's return to him.The fact that appellant failed to follow petitioner's advice that he obtain the required StateCentral Registry clearance for his girlfriend, failed to visit the child more frequently after his[*2]visitation was changed to a supervised environment at thepetitioning agency, and refused to plan for the care of the child independently of his teenagegirlfriend does not mean that petitioner did not meet its obligation to make diligent efforts toassist, develop and encourage a meaningful relationship between appellant and the child. Anagency "is not a guarantor of a parent's success" (Matter of Amanda R., 215 AD2d 220,220 [1995]). The parent must assume some measure of initiative and responsibility (seeMatter of Byron Christopher Malik J., 309 AD2d 669 [2003]). The agency will be deemed tohave fulfilled its duty if its reasonable efforts are rebuffed by an uncooperative or indifferentparent (Matter of James X., 37AD3d 1003, 1006 [2007]).
The court correctly determined that appellant did not plan for the child's future, as requiredby Social Services Law § 384-b (7) (c). Nor did he maintain regular contact with the child.After his visits reverted to weekly—and eventually biweekly—supervised visits atthe petitioning agency, appellant visited his daughter only once between January and March2006, and did not call to cancel or confirm any of the remaining scheduled visits. Even though hedid partially complete the services plan established by petitioner, he did not complete or fullybenefit from the evaluations and services required by petitioner, never obtaining the requiredmental health evaluation, and exhibiting inability to control his anger when faced withcircumstances he did not like. Most significantly, appellant failed to heed petitioner's advice thathe cease having inappropriate relationships with minors and plan for the future care of his childindependently of his teenage girlfriend. The evidence clearly established that appellant failed toacknowledge and gain insight from his past mistakes, fully benefit from the services provided tohim, and take responsibility for the child's placement in foster care in the first place. Accordingly,the finding of permanent neglect was fully substantiated (see Matter of Myles N., 49 AD3d 381 [2008]).
Appellant argues alternatively that the court should have suspended judgment. However, hehas not demonstrated the initiative to ameliorate the conditions that led to the child's placementin foster care sufficient to warrant suspension of judgment (see Matter of Juan Andres R.,216 AD2d 145 [1995]). Concur—Saxe, J.P., Nardelli, Moskowitz, Renwick andFreedman, JJ.