Tauber v Village of Spring Val.
2008 NY Slip Op 09068 [56 AD3d 660]
November 18, 2008
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 7, 2009


Michael Tauber, Respondent,
v
Village of Spring Valley,Appellant.

—[*1]Bruce M. Levine, Spring Valley, N.Y., for appellant.

Paul Savad, Nanuet, N.Y. (Susan Cooper of counsel), for respondent.

In an action, inter alia, to compel the specific performance of a contract for the sale of realproperty, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County(Sherwood, J.), dated September 26, 2007, which granted the plaintiff's motion for summaryjudgment dismissing its affirmative defense and directing specific performance of the contractand denied its cross motion for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing the complaint, and (2) ajudgment of the same court dated October 31, 2007, which, upon the order, is in favor of theplaintiff and against it, directing it to convey the subject real property pursuant to the terms of thecontract between the parties.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the plaintiff's motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the defendant's affirmative defense and directing specific performance ofthe contract is denied, the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment, in effect, dismissingthe complaint is granted, the complaint is dismissed, and the order is modified accordingly; and itis further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.[*2]

The appeal from the intermediate order must bedismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment inthe action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on appealfrom the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from thejudgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

The Board of Trustees of the defendant Village of Spring Valley adopted a resolutiondeclaring a parcel of real property on a dead-end road to be surplus property (hereinafter theproperty) and authorizing its sale to the plaintiff. The parties signed a contract of sale and theplaintiff tendered a check for the down payment. When, approximately five months later, theplaintiff demanded that the Village close title, the Village rescinded the contract, returned thedown payment, and adopted another resolution directing that the property be used for a Villagepark.

The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, for specific performance. In its answer, theVillage asserted as an affirmative defense that the contract was, among other things, void due tothe Village's failure to comply, in entering into the contract, with the requirements of the StateEnvironmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]). The plaintiff moved forsummary judgment dismissing the affirmative defense and directing specific performance of thecontract, and the Village cross-moved for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing thecomplaint. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion, denied the cross motion, andentered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, reasoning that the Village's affirmative defense wastime-barred by the four-month statute of limitations applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedingschallenging the validity of municipal actions (see CPLR 217). We disagree and reversethe judgment.

Contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion, the statute of limitations governs thecommencement of an action, not the assertion of a defense (see CPLR 201, 217;Bloomfield v Bloomfield, 97 NY2d 188, 193 [2001]). As the plaintiff concedes, the saleof municipal land is an "action" subject to SEQRA (see ECL 8-0105 [4]; 6 NYCRR617.2 [b] [1]; 617.5 [c] [25]). Having failed to comply with SEQRA's requirement that it eitherdetermine that the proposed sale would not have a significant impact on the environment, andtherefore issue a negative declaration (see 6 NYCRR 617.2 [y]; 617.7 [a] [2]), or makethe requisite findings after considering an environmental impact statement (see ECL8-0109 [8]), the Village's action in entering into the contract of sale was void (see Devitt vHeimbach, 58 NY2d 925, 927 [1983]). Except in an "unusual factual situation," which is notpresented here, estoppel may not be invoked to overcome the failure to comply with SEQRA(see Matter of E.F.S. Ventures Corp. v Foster, 71 NY2d 359, 368-371 [1988]). Spolzino,J.P., Ritter, Dillon and Dickerson, JJ., concur.


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