Matter of Godwin v Town of Huntington
2008 NY Slip Op 09080 [56 AD3d 671]
November 18, 2008
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 7, 2009


In the Matter of Eileen Godwin, Appellant,
v
Town ofHuntington et al., Respondents.

[*1]Edelman, Krasin & Jaye, PLLC, Carle Place, N.Y. (Thomas S. Russo of counsel), forappellant.

John J. Leo, Town Attorney, Huntington, N.Y. (Valerie E. Smith of counsel), forrespondents.

In a proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave toserve a late notice of claim, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, SuffolkCounty (Kerins, J.), dated October 11, 2007, which denied the petition and, in effect, dismissedthe proceeding.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

As relevant to the circumstances of this case, the factors the court considers in determiningwhether, in the exercise of its discretion, the petitioner should be granted leave to serve a latenotice of claim include: whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential factsconstituting the petitioner's claim within 90 days of the claim arising, or a reasonable timethereafter; whether the petitioner had a reasonable excuse for her failure to serve a notice ofclaim in a timely fashion; and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality inmaintaining its defense (see Matter of Vicari v Grand Ave. Middle School, 52 AD3d 838[2008]; Matter of Groves v New York City Tr. Auth., 44 AD3d 856 [2007]; Matter ofMarch v Town of Wappinger, 29 AD3d 998 [2006]; Gibbs v City of New York, 22AD3d 717 [2005]). "In determining whether to grant the extension, the court shall consider, inparticular, whether the public corporation . . . acquired actual knowledge of theessential facts constituting the claim within [90 days of the claim arising] or within a reasonabletime thereafter" (General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]).[*2]

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion indenying the petition, inter alia, for leave to serve a late notice of claim. Contrary to thepetitioner's contention, the notice of claim she served upon the respondent Town of Huntingtonon August 23, 2006 (hereinafter the August 23rd notice), 99 days after the collision of her vehiclewith one owned and operated by the Town, did not give the Town actual knowledge of theessential facts of her claim that the accident was caused by the negligent operation of the townvehicle. The August 23rd notice asserted that the Town was negligent in the design, maintenance,and traffic control of an intersection. It was not until the complaint was served, 11 months later,that the Town had any notice that the claim was premised on the alleged negligent operation ofthe town vehicle.

Moreover, the police accident report, which was received by the Town in June 2006 did notprovide actual knowledge of the claim. The police accident report noted that the accidentoccurred when the vehicle operated by the petitioner crossed the center line of the roadway, onwet pavement, and skidded into the town vehicle. A municipality must have notice or knowledgeof the specific claim; general knowledge that an accident occurred is insufficient (see Matterof Vicari v Grand Ave. Middle School, 52 AD3d 838 [2008]; Matter of Henriques v Cityof New York, 22 AD3d 847, 848 [2005]).

The Town rejected the August 23rd notice on the ground, inter alia, that it was untimely. Thepetitioner did not seek leave of court to serve a late notice of claim until July 31, 2007. Noexplanation was offered for the 11-month delay from the Town's rejection of the August 23rdnotice to the submission of the petition for, among other things, leave to serve a late notice ofclaim. As the August 23rd notice did not provide the Town with notice of the petitioner's claim,any initial delay that might be attributable to difficulty in determining the Town's ownership ofthe vehicle does not excuse the extensive delay in this case.

Additionally, the petitioner did not submit any facts in support of her contention that theTown would not be prejudiced in its defense of the action if leave were granted (see Matter ofKumar v City of New York, 52 AD3d 517, 518 [2008]). Florio, J.P., Angiolillo, McCarthyand Chambers, JJ., concur.


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