Gray v Delaware Equip. Servs., Inc.
2008 NY Slip Op 09142 [56 AD3d 1006]
November 20, 2008
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 7, 2009


Gloria M. Gray, Respondent, v Delaware Equipment Services, Inc.,et al., Appellants, and Robert E. Gray et al., Respondents. (Action No. 1.) Lisa K. Gray,Respondent,
v
Milo F. Knapp Jr. et al., Appellants, and Robert E. Gray, Respondent.(Action No. 2.) Robert E. Gray, Respondent, v Milo F. Knapp Jr. et al., Appellants. (Action No.3.)

—[*1]Matthew S. Lerner, Albany, for Delaware Equipment Services, Inc. and another, [*2]appellants.

Sugarman Law Firm, Syracuse (Jenna W. Klucsik of counsel), for Gloria M. Gray,respondent.

Damon & Morey, L.L.P., Buffalo (Steven M. Zweig of counsel), for Robert E. Gray,respondent.

Garvey & Garvey, Buffalo (Dennis J. Garvey of counsel), for Lisa K. Gray,respondent.

Malone Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Dowd, J.), entered January 14,2008 in Chenango County, which, among other things, denied a motion by defendants DelawareEquipment Services, Inc., Construction Services of Chenango, Inc., Payne's Cranes, Inc., JohnW. Payne and Milo F. Knapp Jr. for summary judgment dismissing the complaints against them.

In September 2003, Gloria M. Gray, Robert E. Gray and Lisa K. Gray were traveling east onInterstate 88 in the Town of Sidney, Delaware County, in a van owned by Lisa Gray and operatedby Robert Gray. The parties were all injured when the van rear-ended an escort vehicle owned bydefendant Delaware Equipment Services, Inc. and operated by defendant Milo F. Knapp Jr., whowas employed by defendant Construction Services of Chenango, Inc. At the time of the accident,Knapp was escorting a crane owned by defendant Payne's Cranes, Inc. Gloria Gray thereaftercommenced action No. 1 against Knapp, Delaware Equipment Services, Construction Services,Payne's Cranes and John W. Payne, who owned the three corporations (hereinafter collectivelyreferred to as defendants), as well as Robert Gray and Lisa Gray. Lisa Gray then commencedaction No. 2 against Robert Gray and defendants, and Robert Gray commenced action No. 3against defendants. As is relevant here, defendants then moved for summary judgment dismissingthe complaints against them. Supreme Court denied the motion, prompting this appeal. We nowaffirm, albeit on slightly different grounds.

When approaching another vehicle from behind, a driver is required to "maintain areasonably safe rate of speed, maintain control of [his or her] vehicle and use reasonable care toavoid colliding with the other [vehicle]" (Atkinson v Safety Kleen Corp., 240 AD2d1003, 1004 [1997]; see Vavoulis vAdler, 43 AD3d 1154, 1155 [2007]). As such, a rear-end collision establishes a primafacie case of negligence on the part of the driver and imposes a duty on him or her to comeforward with a nonnegligent explanation for the accident (see National Interstate v A.J. Murphy Co., Inc., 9 AD3d 714, 715[2004]). Here, defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law bysubmitting evidence that the vehicle driven by Knapp was rear-ended by the Gray vehicle. Inopposition, plaintiffs contended that defendants were negligent in that the escort vehicle wasbeing operated at a dangerously slow rate of speed, without adequate warning lights, in foggyweather conditions.

Initially, plaintiffs' claim of foggy weather conditions does not provide a sufficientnonnegligent explanation for the accident (see e.g. National Interstate v A.J. Murphy Co.,Inc., 9 [*3]AD3d at 715-716; Mitchell v Gonzalez,269 AD2d 250, 251 [2000]). Likewise, plaintiffs' allegation that defendants were negligentbecause the special hauling permit for the crane was invalid due to numerous statutory andregulatory violations related to the escort vehicle is also insufficient. Even if the sections citedcan be construed as creating a duty of care for the benefit of other motorists, plaintiffs failed tooffer evidence that any of the alleged violations was a proximate cause of the accident (seee.g. Dance v Town of Southampton, 95 AD2d 442, 445-446 [1983]).

However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a question of factexists as to whether the warning and tail lights on the escort vehicle were adequate and activatedto alert other drivers of the vehicle's slow speed. While Knapp testified that he routinely inspectsand turns on the vehicle's warning and tail lights prior to travel, Robert Gray and Lisa Gray bothtestified that no warning lights were visible prior to the collision and the tail lights were verydim. This testimony was sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the escort vehiclewas adequately equipped with warning and tail lights and, if so, whether they were functional andactivated at the time of the accident (see Silvestro v Wartella, 224 AD2d 799, 799[1996]; compare Jaycox v Hardesty, 305 AD2d 720 [2003]; Rodriguez-Johnson vHunt, 279 AD2d 781 [2001]). As such, Supreme Court properly denied defendants' motionfor summary judgment dismissing the complaints against them.

Finally, contrary to defendants' contention, Supreme Court's consideration of the affidavits ofplaintiffs' experts was not improper (see De Long v County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296, 307[1983]).

Spain, J.P., Lahtinen, Kane and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withone bill of costs.


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