Johnson v Dow
2008 NY Slip Op 09230 [56 AD3d 1288]
November 21, 2008
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 7, 2009


Judith A. Johnson, Respondent, v Mary E. Dow, Appellant, et al.,Defendants.

—[*1]Taylor & Associates, Albany (Keith M. Frary of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Stanley Law Offices, LLP, Syracuse (Joseph P. Stanley of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Anthony J. Paris, J.), enteredSeptember 28, 2007 in a personal injury action. The order denied the motion of defendant MaryE. Dow for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against her.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries she sustainedwhen her vehicle was rear-ended while stopped at a red light. Mary E. Dow (defendant) contendsthat Supreme Court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaintagainst her because plaintiff failed to specify in her bill of particulars the particular category ofserious injury that she allegedly sustained (see Insurance Law § 5102 [d]). Wereject that contention. "[T]he drastic remedy of striking a pleading is not appropriate absent aclear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands was willful or contumacious"(Anonymous v Duane Reade, Inc., 49 AD3d 479, 480 [2008]) and, here, defendant failedto make that showing (see Kosh v Naughton, 45 AD3d 1324 [2007]; Randazzo v OurLady of Mercy Med. Ctr., 284 AD2d 158 [2001]). The remedy for a plaintiff's failure tocomply with a demand for a bill of particulars is a motion to compel compliance (seeCPLR 3042 [c]; Randazzo, 284 AD2d 158 [2001]), and it does not appear on therecord before us that defendant made such a motion (see Randazzo, 284 AD2d 158[2001]). To the extent that defendant's motion may be construed to contend that defendant isentitled to summary judgment because plaintiff did not in fact sustain a serious injury, we rejectthat contention. Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant established her entitlement to judgmentas a matter of law, we conclude that plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact sufficient to defeat themotion (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).Present—Scudder, P.J., Martoche, Centra, Lunn and Gorski, JJ.


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