| Matter of Golden |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 09333 [56 AD3d 1109] |
| November 26, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Earl William Golden III,Petitioner. |
—[*1]
Cardona, P.J. Motion pursuant to CPLR 5704 (a) to vacate an ex parte order of the SupremeCourt (Tait, J.), entered May 9, 2008 in Broome County, which dismissed petitioner's applicationfor leave to assume another name.
Petitioner, a transgendered individual, was born a male but now identifies as a female. InOctober 2007, petitioner commenced this proceeding seeking to assume the name "ElisabethWhitney Golden." In response to a request from Supreme Court for further information,petitioner submitted an affidavit explaining, among other things, that a name change was soughtbecause it corresponds with petitioner's female gender identity. Included in the submission wasan affidavit from petitioner's spouse indicating that she supported the name change request andhad no objection thereto. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding, among other things, thatthe proposed change from a traditionally male name to a traditionally female name "is fraughtwith possible confusion." Petitioner now brings this application pursuant to CPLR 5704 (a)seeking review of Supreme Court's ex parte order.
Upon examination of the record, we conclude that reversal is warranted. "Under the commonlaw a person may change his or her name at will so long as there is no fraud, misrepresentation orinterference with the rights of others" (Matter of Halligan, 46 AD2d 170, 171 [1974][citations omitted]). Notably, the Civil Rights Law provides an additional method to accomplishthis purpose "whereby a change of name is authorized by judicial proceedings" allowing it to be"speedy, definite and a matter of record" (Smith v United States Cas. Co., 197 NY 420,429 [1910]; see Civil Rights Law art 6). Both the common law and statutory "proceduresexist side by side supplementing each other" (Matter of Halligan, 46 AD2d at 171). Inreviewing a petition requesting judicial authorization of a [*2]name change, courts must issue such relief if "satisfied. . . that the petition is true, and that there is no reasonable objection to the changeof name proposed" (Civil Rights Law § 63). "Given this limited power of review, courtsordinarily grant petitions by adults unless there is a demonstrable reason not to do so" (Matterof Washington, 216 AD2d 781, 782 [1995] [citation omitted]; see Matter of Waters,264 AD2d 910, 910 [1999]; Matter of Madison, 261 AD2d 738, 738-739 [1999]).
Here, the record shows that petitioner satisfied the technical requirements for a name changeunder the Civil Rights Law, which include, among other things, that the petition specify thegrounds for the application and disclose pertinent background information (see CivilRights Law § 61). Although Supreme Court properly noted the potential for confusion as aground for denying the petition, that factor is not, standing alone, a basis to deny a petitioninasmuch as "confusion is a normal concomitant of any name change" (Matter ofHalligan, 46 AD2d at 172; see Matter of Alvarado, 166 AD2d 932, 932 [1990]).Thus, under the particular circumstances herein and in the absence of factors inferring "fraud,misrepresentation or interference with the rights of others" (Matter of Halligan, 46 AD2dat 171; see Smith v United States Cas. Co., 197 NY at 428-429), we conclude that thepetition should be granted.
Finally, in remitting the matter to Supreme Court for issuance of the appropriate order, wenote that the language employed therein should specifically set forth that the name change ordercannot be used as evidence that the gender of petitioner has been changed from male to female.
Spain, Carpinello, Malone Jr. and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the motion is granted,without costs, application for leave to assume another name granted, and matter remitted to theSupreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.