| Melendez v County of Nassau |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 09367 [56 AD3d 736] |
| November 25, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Angel Melendez, Jr., Appellant, v County of Nassau et al.,Defendants, and Frank Goldsmith, Respondent. |
—[*1] Cullen and Dykman, LLP, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Patrick Neglia of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Nassau County (Martin, J.), dated September 26, 2007, which, upon a juryverdict finding the plaintiff and the defendant Frank Goldsmith each 50% at fault in thehappening of an accident, granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Frank Goldsmithwhich was pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured when a vehicle he was driving collided with a vehicledriven by the defendant Frank Goldsmith (hereinafter the defendant) at an intersection. It is notdisputed that the plaintiff's direction of traffic was controlled by a flashing red light, and thedefendant's by a flashing yellow light. The speed limit was 40 miles per hour. At trial, theplaintiff testified that he came to a full stop at the intersection and observed the defendant'svehicle approaching approximately 90 to 120 feet away. The plaintiff was unsure whether thedefendant's vehicle was a minivan or a sedan, and could not estimate its speed when firstobserved. However, he testified, it appeared to be slowing down. The plaintiff drove his vehicleinto the intersection and, two or three seconds later, when he was approximately half-waythrough, collided with the defendant's vehicle. The plaintiff did not keep the defendant's vehiclein his field of vision and observed it a second time only at the point of impact. However, heopined, the defendant "had to have sped up" prior to the impact. The jury found the plaintiff andthe defendant each 50% at fault in the happening of the accident. The Supreme Court thereaftergranted [*2]that branch of the defendant's motion which waspursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law. We affirm.
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1113 (a) provides that a driver facing a red flashing lightmust stop before entering the intersection, and that the right to proceed is subject to the rulesapplicable after making a stop at a stop sign. A driver who fails to yield the right-of-way afterstopping at a stop sign is in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 (a) and negligentas a matter of law (see Exime v Williams, 45 AD3d 633 [2007]; Gergis v Miccio,39 AD3d 468 [2007]). A driver with the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that others willobey the applicable traffic laws and yield the right-of-way (see Maliza v Puerto-Rican Transp.Corp., 50 AD3d 650 [2008]; McCain v Larosa, 41 AD3d 792 [2007]). Here,considering the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and affording him the benefit ofevery favorable inference that may be properly drawn therefrom, there was no valid line ofreasoning and permissible inferences which possibly could have led rational persons to theconclusion reached by the jury that the defendant was 50% at fault in the happening of theaccident (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553 [1997]; Hand v Field, 15 AD3d542 [2005]). A conclusion that the defendant was contributorily negligent because he "had tohave sped up" prior to the contact was speculative. Ritter, J.P., Florio, Miller and Carni, JJ.,concur.