| Hossain v Fab Cab Corp. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 09561 [57 AD3d 484] |
| December 2, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Sheikh Hossain, Respondent, v Fab Cab Corp., Defendant, andYellow Cab SLS Jet Management Corp. et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Kenneth L. Falk, New York, N.Y., for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Yellow Cab SLS JetManagement Corp. and Manhattan Maintenance Corp. appeal from an order of the Supreme Court,Queens County (Schulman, J.), entered January 30, 2008, which denied their motion pursuant toCPLR 317 and 5015 to vacate a judgment of the same court entered September 13, 2005, upon theirdefault in answering the complaint, which was in favor of the plaintiff and against them in the principalsum of $100,000.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the appellants' motionwhich was pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4) to vacate the judgment entered September 13, 2005, isgranted, and the remaining branches of the motion are denied as academic.
It is " 'axiomatic that the failure to serve process in an action leaves the court without personaljurisdiction over the defendant, and all subsequent proceedings are thereby rendered null and void' "(Elm Mgt. Corp. v Sprung, 33 AD3d753, 755 [2006], quoting McMullen v Arnone, 79 AD2d 496, 499 [1981]; Matter ofCartier v County of Nassau, 281 AD2d 477, 478 [2001]). Under CPLR 5015 (a) (4), a defaultjudgment must be vacated once a movant demonstrates lack of personal jurisdiction (see Citibank vKeller, 133 AD2d 63, 64-65 [1987]; see also Harkless v Reid, 23 AD3d 622, 622-623 [2005]; Steele vHempstead Pub Taxi, 305 AD2d 401, 402 [2003]). Here, the process server served the summonswith notice upon a receptionist in the appellants' offices, and there is no evidence that she was anofficer, director, [*2]managing agent, cashier, or an agent authorized byappointment to accept service on their behalf (see CPLR 311 [a] [1]; Gleizer v American Airlines, Inc., 30 AD3d376 [2006]). Accordingly, jurisdiction was never obtained over the appellants, and the SupremeCourt should have granted that branch of their motion which was pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4) tovacate the default judgment. Rivera, J.P., Florio, Angiolillo, McCarthy and Chambers, JJ., concur.