| People v Henderson |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 09618 [57 AD3d 562] |
| December 2, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert D.Henderson, Appellant. |
—[*1] William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Bridget Rahilly Steller of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Hayes, J.),rendered May 12, 2006, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourthdegree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, aftera hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physicalevidence and his statement to a law enforcement official.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
"On a motion to suppress physical evidence, the People bear the burden of going forward toestablish the legality of police conduct in the first instance" (People v Hernandez, 40 AD3d 777, 778 [2007]). " 'Probable causedoes not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merelyinformation sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed orthat evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place' and that the person being arrested committedthe crime or offense" (People v Francis,44 AD3d 788, 789 [2007], quoting People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985])."That legal conclusion is to be made after considering 'all of the facts and circumstances together' "(People v Francis, 44 AD3d at 789, quoting People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d at 423).The hearing court had the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses firsthand, and thus its probablecause determination is to be accorded great weight on appeal, and "will not be disturbed unless clearlyunsupported by the record" (People v Francis, 44 AD3d at 789; see People vProchilo, 41 NY2d 759, 761 [1977]).[*2]
Here, the County Court properly denied that branch of thedefendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence discovered in a container in thetrunk of his vehicle. The evidence at the suppression hearing established that, on August 22, 2005, atthe direction of police, a confidential informant placed a telephone call to a number he had, ordered aquantity of crack cocaine, and arranged to acquire the narcotics at a designated location. The defendantarrived at the designated location and sold a quantity of crack cocaine to the confidential informant fromthe trunk of his vehicle. On August 26, 2005 the same confidential informant ordered the same quantityof crack cocaine from the same telephone number. The defendant arrived at the same location in thesame vehicle. Additionally, after he exited the vehicle and began to walk away, police observed himdepositing an envelope into a trash can. The envelope was subsequently recovered by police, and itcontained what appeared to be marijuana. Under these circumstances, the police had probable causeto arrest the defendant (see generally People v Francis, 44 AD3d at 789; cf. People vPicone, 108 AD2d 932 [1985]).
Moreover, "the very circumstances that supply probable cause for the arrest may also give thepolice probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband, evidence of the crime, a weaponor some means of escape. If so, a warrantless search of the vehicle is authorized, not as a searchincident to arrest, but rather as a search falling within the automobile exception to the warrantrequirement" (People v Blasich, 73 NY2d 673, 678 [1989]; see People v Belton, 55NY2d 49, 53-55 [1982]; People vQuagliata, 53 AD3d 670, 671-672 [2008]). " '[W]here police have validly arrested anoccupant of an automobile, and they have reason to believe that the car may contain evidence related tothe crime for which the occupant was arrested or that a weapon may be discovered or a means ofescape thwarted, they may contemporaneously search the passenger compartment, including anycontainers found therein' " (People v Blasich, 73 NY2d at 678-679, quoting People vBelton, 55 NY2d at 55). Under the circumstances presented here, the police were justified insearching not only the passenger compartment of the defendant's vehicle, but the trunk thereof, and acontainer found therein. Based on the August 22, 2005 transaction and the similar circumstancespresented on August 26, 2005 the police had reason to believe that narcotics were concealed in thetrunk of the defendant's vehicle. The justification for the search was bolstered by the presence of a bagcontaining what appeared to be marijuana in plain view in the vehicle's passenger compartment (see People v Cruz, 7 AD3d 335, 337[2004]). Moreover, "[t]he fact that the search of the car was conducted after the vehicle had beenbrought to the police station does not dissipate the justification for a warrantless search conducted uponprobable cause pursuant to the automobile exception" (People v Williams, 173 AD2d 663,664 [1991]; see People v Blasich, 73 NY2d at 681).
With regard to the defendant's statement to a law enforcement official, "[t]he credibilitydeterminations of the [hearing] [c]ourt, which saw and heard the witnesses at the suppression hearing,are entitled to great weight on appeal, and will not be disturbed unless they are unsupported by therecord" (People v Timmons, 54 AD3d883, 885 [2008]; see People v Prochilo, 41 NY2d at 761). Based on the evidencepresented at the hearing, we find that the defendant's spontaneous statement, made after a police officerarrested him but before Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436[1966]) were administered, was not triggered by any police questioning or other conduct whichreasonably could have been expected to elicit a declaration from him (see People v Whyte, 47 AD3d 852,853 [2008]; People v Baliukonis, 35AD3d 626 [2006]). Accordingly, the hearing court properly denied that branch of the defendant'somnibus motion which was to suppress his statement to a law enforcement official.
Review of the remaining contentions raised in the defendant's supplemental pro se brief was [*3]forfeited by his plea of guilty. Spolzino, J.P., Angiolillo, Dickerson andBelen, JJ., concur.