| Byrd v 2015 Caton Ave., LLC |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 10575 [57 AD3d 933] |
| December 30, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Dior Byrd et al., Respondents, v 2015 Caton Ave., LLC etal., Appellants. |
—[*1] Levy Phillips & Konigsberg, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Philip Monier III of counsel), forrespondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal from anorder of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), dated August 27, 2007, which deniedtheir motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion forsummary judgment is granted.
The infant plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries from exposure to lead paint in an apartmentowned by the defendant 2015 Caton Ave., LLC. The Supreme Court denied the defendants'motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that triable issues of factexisted as to whether the defendants had actual or constructive notice of a lead-based paintcondition in the subject apartment. We reverse.
The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law bydemonstrating that they did not have notice that the infant plaintiff, who was under two years oldat the relevant time, resided at the subject apartment before he sustained any injuries (seeChapman v Silber, 97 NY2d 9, 15 [2001]; Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, 88 NY2d628, 646 [1996]; Duarte v Community Realty Corp., 42 AD3d 480, 481 [2007]). Inopposition to the defendants' prima facie showing, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue offact as to whether the defendants had such notice (see Duarte v Community Realty Corp.,42 AD3d at 481; Worthy v New York City Hous. Auth., 18 AD3d 352 [2005]).Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants' motion for summary [*2]judgment.
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Miller, Carni andChambers, JJ., concur.