York v Landa
2008 NY Slip Op 10614 [57 AD3d 980]
December 30, 2008
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 11, 2009


Esther York, Respondent,
v
Jay Landa,Appellant.

—[*1]L'Abbate, Balkan, Colavita & Contini, LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Peter D. Rigelhaupt ofcounsel), for appellant.

David H. Singer, New York, N.Y., for respondent.

In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendant appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Queens County (Agate, J.), dated August 30, 2007, which denied his motionto dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant, who represented the plaintiff in a matrimonial matter, claimed that, as ofNovember 2002, the plaintiff owed him $167,000 in legal fees, a claim which the plaintiffdisputed. In a written agreement dated November 25, 2002 the parties stipulated that the plaintiffwould pay the defendant $75,000 in full satisfaction of all outstanding legal fees. The agreementprovided, inter alia, that the plaintiff is "obligated to pay [the defendant] $75,000, regardless ofthe outcome of the litigation," and that the defendant "ha[s] a statutory charging lien in the agreedsum of $75,000 for services rendered to date on the proceeds of the money judgments against[the plaintiff's] husband that [the defendant is] seeking to collect."

Approximately one year later, having allegedly received no payment under the settlementagreement, the defendant made a motion in the underlying matrimonial action, which he styled asa motion for an order determining that he had a statutory charging lien in the amount of $75,000and directing the [*2]entry of a money judgment against theplaintiff in that amount. After a hearing, the Supreme Court issued an order entered March 23,2007 determining that the defendant had a statutory charging lien in the amount of $75,000 onthe proceeds of the money judgments previously entered in the underlying action, and directingthe County Clerk to enter a money judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff inthe amount of $75,000, plus interest.

Meanwhile, the plaintiff commenced the instant legal malpractice action against thedefendant, alleging specific omissions and deficiencies in the defendant's representation of her.The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), on the ground thatthe Supreme Court had determined in the underlying action that he was entitled to an award of anattorney's fee, thereby necessarily deciding that he had not committed legal malpractice, and thusthe plaintiff's action against him was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The defendantnow appeals from an order of the Supreme Court denying his motion to dismiss the complaint.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel "bars relitigation of an issue 'which has necessarilybeen decided in [a] prior action and is decisive of the present action' if there has been 'a fulland fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling' " (Tydings vGreenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 NY3d 195, 199 [2008], quoting Buechel v Bain,97 NY2d 295, 303-304 [2001] [emphasis added]). Pursuant to this doctrine, a legalmalpractice action generally will be barred by the defendant's "successful prosecution of a prioraction to recover fees for the same legal services which the [plaintiff] presently allege[s] werenegligently performed" (Pirog v Ingber, 203 AD2d 348, 348-349 [1994]; see Blair vBartlett, 75 NY 150 [1878]; Altamore v Friedman, 193 AD2d 240, 244-248 [1993]).

Here, in support of his motion to dismiss the complaint, the defendant failed to establish thatthe services for which he secured payment through the November 2002 settlement agreementwith the plaintiff were "the same legal services" as those which are the subject of the instant legalmalpractice action (Pirog v Ingber, 203 AD2d at 348; see Blair v Bartlett, 75 NYat 154 [medical malpractice action barred where defendant physician's complaint in prior actionto collect payment for his services involved "the same services which are set forth in thecomplaint in the action now before us, as the malpractice sued for"]).

Moreover, only those facts which "must have been proved" by the defendant in theunderlying matrimonial action can be deemed to have been necessarily decided in that action(Blair v Bartlett, 75 NY 150, 154 [1878]). Regardless of how the defendant's motion inthe underlying action was denominated, the true nature of the relief sought in that motion was notpayment for services rendered to the plaintiff, but the enforcement of the November 2002settlement agreement, which fixed the amount owed to the defendant at $75,000. Thus, inprocuring the order dated March 13, 2007 the defendant was not required to prove that heperformed legal services for the plaintiff, or that those services were worth $75,000 (seeResnick v Resnick, 24 AD3d 238 [2005]; cf. Chisholm-Ryder Co. v Sommer & Sommer,78 AD2d 143, 145-146 [1980]). Rather, the only issue actually before the court was whetherthe defendant and the plaintiff had entered into a valid, enforceable agreement requiring theplaintiff to pay the defendant $75,000.

Thus, the issue of whether the defendant committed legal malpractice was not necessarilydecided in the underlying action, and the plaintiff is not precluded from raising that issue in theinstant action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismissthe complaint as barred [*3]by collateral estoppel. Prudenti, P.J.,Dillon, Eng and Leventhal, JJ., concur.


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