| People v Lin Chen |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 52153(U) [21 Misc 3d 1123(A)] |
| Decided on October 15, 2008 |
| Supreme Court, Kings County |
| McKay, J. |
| As corrected in part through January 28, 2009; it will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports. |
The People of the Stateof New York, Plaintiff, against Lin Chen, LING DONG, SHI DONG and XING DONG,DEFENDANTS. |
6429-07
For the People: Assistant District Attorney Kelli M. Muse, Kings County
For the Defense: Scott B. Tulman, Esq., Jonathan D. Sims, Esq., John Russell, Esq.
Joseph Kevin McKay, J.
Defendants' joint motion to dismiss this indictment based on a violation of theirstatutory rights under CPL 30.30 is GRANTED. The Court has reviewed all papers submitted insupport of and in opposition to this motion and has heard oral argument from both sides onSeptember 16, 2008.
Defendants claim 249 days (the Court computed 251 days)[FN1] are chargeable to the People from thecommencement of those actions in Criminal Court on July 5, 2007 and June 11, 2008, when anew statement of readiness was served and filed by the People, followed by this motion. Theprosecution acknowledges that all of the periods claimed by defense were in fact charged to thePeople during the course of the pre-trial proceedings, but belatedly claim that they continued tobe ready throughout these periods, in reliance on the original statement of readiness served andfiled on August 3, 2007, with the filing of the indictment, and that all these adjournmentsconcerned discovery, which should not result in chargeable time.
Given that this initial statement of readiness has been called into question and challenged bythis motion, the District Attorney must justify its bona fides and its continued viability.Neither the prosecutor's affirmation in opposition nor the Assistant's oral argument presentationmake a strong defense of its legitimacy, i.e., that it was an [*2]effective statement of the People's then current readiness. Theexplanation sounded as if, as of the filing of the indictment, the District Attorney was ready forthe next step in the process and could get ready for trial soon if that were to become necessary.
The admitted turnover in assigned personnel within the District Attorney's office, whichaccounted for at least some of the many excessive and unreasonable delays in obeying thedirections of the Calendar Judges, calls into question the continued viability of that initialstatement of readiness, even if it was justified at the time. These repeated and flagrant failures ofthe prosecution to follow the directions of the Court since November 2, 2007 until June 11, 2008simply cannot be ignored nor be shielded by an early, apparently pro forma statement ofreadiness. See, People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985).
An example of the prosecution's failure to demonstrate continued readiness is the lack ofdocumentation from the prior assigned Assistant, who left the office in December 2007. Nocopies of subpoenas, no affidavits of service of material allegedly sent to the defense attorneys onDecember 10, 2007 but not received by them, no details of efforts to comply in timely fashionwith Court directions, and no transition memorandum explaining the status of the case at the timeof transmittal to another Assistant, were produced. Another example of the prosecution's failureto be continuously ready for trial is their long-delayed response to yet another Court direction onMarch 4, 2008 to furnish certain material to the defense, specifying that the People could stop therunning of speedy trial time by serving and filing a new statement of readiness when thedirections were followed and when the prosecution was ready. The prosecutor delayed filing anew statement of readiness until June 11, 2008.
The People now argue (in legal argument, not in the Affirmation in Opposition) that themedical records were not needed for trial as far as the prosecution is concerned, and invoke caseswhich hold that the failure to produce medical records should not result in a speedy trialviolation. See, People v.Wright, 50 AD3d 429 (1st Dept 2008), lv denied 10 NY3d 966 (2008);People v. Biamonte, 19 Misc 3d 139(A) (App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008). Thetime to have made that point to the Court was much earlier when the prosecution, instead,undertook to obtain the medical records for their own use and in turn to provide them to thedefense, which was not disputed by the People on any of the several calendar calls of thisindictment.
Defendants rely on the law of the case doctrine and cite People v. Gonzalez, 266AD2d 562 (2d Dept 1999), lv. denied 94 NY2d 920 (2000). That case isambiguous at best regarding the application of the "law of the case" rule to 30.30 motions, but nodoubt the Court should accord great deference to the calendar rulings of other Judges ofcoordinate jurisdiction, at least when those rulings are made in an adversarial setting in opencourt, after hearing from both sides. Compare, People v. Berkowitz, 50 NY2d333 (1980). Consider also the cases which hold that the prosecution is entitled to rely on priorCourt rulings or designations that certain adjournments are excludable. People v.Robinson, 171 AD2d 475 (1st Dept 1991), lv. denied 78 NY2d 973 (1991)and People v. Wilson, 119 AD2d 843 (2nd Dept 1986). Surely this principle should applyto the defense under appropriate, similar circumstances, and permit the defense to rely onreasonable contrary [*3]designations. It is therefore in that veinthat I am now following the prior designation of a previous Calendar Judge and my own similardesignations in holding that: those periods represent unreasonable delays by theprosecution, that they legitimately call into question the continued actual present readiness of theprosecution and are thereby deemed to impair that "readiness." Those delays also impaired theability of the defense and the Court to proceed to the hearing and trial of this indictment.
These circumstances place this indictment in the posture of other cases where Courts havefound that even discovery delays - - in violation of Court orders - - can cause speedy trialviolations. People v. Daley, 265 AD2d 566 (2d Dept 1999); People v. Reid, 245AD2d 44 (1st Dept 1997); lv. denied 91 NY2d 1012 (1998); People v.Holmes, 206 AD2d 542, 544 (2d Dept 1994), lv. denied 79 NY2d 920(1992). Accordingly, under the special circumstances of this indictment, I have concluded that allof the periods of delay described in this opinion are properly chargeable to the prosecution, andexceed the statutory period of 184 days for the People to be actually ready for trial. Theindictment is DISMISSED against all defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER,
___________________________
J.S.C.
Footnote 1: This calculation includes 29days of pre-indictment time, and all adjournments from November 2, 2007 until June 11, 2008,which add up to 222 days.