| Jara v Strong Steel Door, Inc. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 00191 [58 AD3d 600] |
| January 13, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Segundo Jara et al., Plaintiffs, and Carlos Huerta,Respondent, v Strong Steel Door, Inc., et al., Appellants, et al.,Defendants. |
—[*1] Barnes Iaccarino Virginia Ambinder & Shepherd, PLLC, New York, N.Y. (Lloyd Ambinderand Ladonna Lusher of counsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendants StrongSteel Door, Inc., and David Wei appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, KingsCounty (Demarest, J.), dated September 12, 2007, as denied that branch of their motion whichwas for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff CarlosHuerta against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The defendants Strong Steel Door, Inc., and David Wei (hereinafter together Strong SteelDoor) entered into several contracts with different municipalities for the performance ofconstruction work. For that purpose, Strong Steel Door hired the plaintiff Carlos Huerta. Prior todoing so, Strong Steel Door requested that he provide documentation of his eligibility to work inthe United States. Huerta complied by producing an alien registration card and Social Securitycard. Subsequently, Huerta's employment was terminated and, as a result, he, and otherssimilarly situated, commenced this action seeking payment of a prevailing wage in accordancewith Strong Steel Door's public works contracts. Meanwhile, Strong Steel Door learned thatHuerta had provided false documentation, a fact which he does not dispute. Strong Steel Doormoved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by Huertaagainst it and the Supreme Court [*2]denied that branch of itsmotion.
Strong Steel Door does not contend that because Huerta violated provisions of theImmigration Reform and Control Act (hereinafter IRCA) (see 8 USC § 1324aet seq.) he is, in accordance with Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v NLRB(535 US 137 [2002]), precluded from recovering damages. Instead, Strong Steel Door contendsthat Huerta entered into an illegal contract which renders it unenforceable as a matter of NewYork law. Additionally, it contends that Huerta's unclean hands preclude him from recovering inequity. We disagree.
As a general rule, illegal contracts are unenforceable (see e.g. Lloyd Capital Corp. v PatHenchar, Inc., 80 NY2d 124, 127 [1992]). However, contrary to Strong Steel Door'scontention, neither the contract at issue nor the work Huerta performed was illegal (see Majlinger v Cassino Contr. Corp.,25 AD3d 14, 24 [2005] ["As between the undocumented worker and the employer,however, there is a contract of employment, under which the worker is entitled to be paid for hisor her work"], affd sub nom. Balbuena v IDR Realty LLC, 6 NY3d 338, 361 [2006]["Although recoveries have been denied to parties who have engaged in illegal activities, inthose cases it was the work being performed that was outlawed, whereas here, the constructionwork itself was entirely lawful"] [citations omitted]; see also Matter of Sackolwitz vHamburg & Co., 295 NY 264, 268 [1946]; Noreen v Vogel & Bros., 231 NY 317[1921]; cf. Spivak v Sachs, 16 NY2d 163, 168 [1965]; Harris v EconomicOpportunity Commn. of Nassau County, 171 AD2d 223 [1991]).
Nor is Strong Steel Door entitled to summary judgment dismissing Huerta's alternativeclaims for equitable relief under theories of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. "Thedoctrine of unclean hands applies when the complaining party shows that the offending party isguilty of immoral, unconscionable conduct and even then only when the conduct relied on isdirectly related to the subject matter in litigation and the party seeking to invoke the doctrine wasinjured by such conduct" (Columbo vColumbo, 50 AD3d 617, 619 [2008]; see National Distillers & Chem. Corp. vSeyopp Corp., 17 NY2d 12, 15-16 [1966]). Here, Strong Steel Door was not injured byHuerta's production of false documentation, as it received bargained-for labor (see Fade v Pugliani/Fade, 8 AD3d612, 614 [2004]; 390 W. End Assoc. v Baron, 274 AD2d 330, 332-333 [2000]).
Finally, Strong Steel Door failed to satisfy its prima facie burden of establishing that it didpay Huerta a prevailing wage, which requires the denial of its motion regardless of thesufficiency of the opposing papers (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324[1986]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Strong Steel Door's motionwhich was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by Huerta againstit. Prudenti, P.J., Carni, and Belen, JJ., concur.
Fisher, J. (concuring in the result and votes to affirm the order insofar as appealed from, withthe following memorandum in which McCarthy, J., concurs). The plaintiff Carlos Huerta doesnot contend that he was not paid for work he performed for the defendants Strong Steel Door,Inc., and David Wei (hereinafter together Strong Steel Door). Instead, he contends that, pursuantto its construction contracts with several municipalities, Strong Steel Door was required to payits workers the prevailing wage, together with [*3]certainbenefits and overtime pay, but that it did not make such payments to him. I agree that theSupreme Court properly denied that branch of Strong Steel Door's motion which was forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by Huerta against it because, asa threshold matter, there are triable issues of fact as to whether Strong Steel Door was actuallyinduced to offer Huerta employment in the first instance as a result of his admitted production ofa forged alien registration card as well as a forged Social Security card. If so, Huerta cannotprevail in this action (see Coque v Wildflower Estates Dev., 58 AD3d 44 [2008]). Moreover, even if Strong Steel Door was not so induced, thereremain questions of fact as to whether Strong Steel Door did in fact pay Huerta the requiredprevailing wage together with benefits and overtime. Accordingly, I vote to affirm the orderinsofar as appealed from. [See 16 Misc 3d 1139(A), 2007 NY Slip Op 51755(U).]