| Jones v Safi |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 00192 [58 AD3d 603] |
| January 13, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Robert Dillard Jones, Appellant, v Naziemul Safi et al.,Defendants, and Lazarowitz & Manganillo, P.C., et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] H. Lazarowitz & C. Manganillo, PLLC, Hempstead, N.Y. (Harvey O. Lazarowitz ofcounsel), for respondent Lazarowitz & Manganillo, P.C. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Susan Davidson of counsel),for respondents City of New York Agencies. Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Richard Dearing and Patrick J.Walsh of counsel), for respondents State of New York Agencies.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice and fraud, the plaintiffappeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Ruchelsman, J.), dated June 8, 2007, as granted those branches of the separate cross motions ofthe defendants Lazarowitz & Manganillo, P.C., City of New York Agencies, and State of NewYork Agencies which were to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them onthe ground that it was time-barred.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs payable tothe respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
In this action, the plaintiff seeks, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice andfraud stemming from the sale of two buildings located on Wilson Avenue in Brooklyn. Inaddition, the plaintiff claims that several federal, state, and city law enforcement agenciesnegligently [*2]failed to investigate and prosecute the variousparties that he accused of real estate fraud. Regardless of whether the plaintiff's claims accrued inSeptember 1996 (when the real estate closings occurred), in February 1997 (when the buyerdefaulted on the second mortgages), or in the fall of 1997 (when the plaintiff filed a series ofcomplaints with the law enforcement agencies), they were properly dismissed insofar as assertedagainst the respondents as untimely because the present action was not commenced until the fallof 2006 (see CPLR 213 [8]; 214 [6]; 215 [1]; 217 [1]).
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not toll thestatute of limitations in this case because there is no evidence that any of the respondentsinduced him, by fraud, misrepresentations or deception, to refrain from filing a timely action (see Zumpano v Quinn, 6 NY3d666 [2006]; Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442 [1978]).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Miller, Carni andChambers, JJ., concur.