People v Velazquez
2009 NY Slip Op 00232 [58 AD3d 646]
January 13, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 11, 2009


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Wilfredo Velazquez, Appellant.

[*1]Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Nancy E. Little of counsel), for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Sharon Y.Brodt, and Howard D. McCallum of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Knopf, J.),rendered July 17, 2006, convicting him of burglary in the third degree and criminal possession ofa weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing an indeterminate sentence of 15years to life imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently with each other.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, byvacating the adjudication of the defendant as a persistent felony offender, adjudicating him asecond felony offender, and reducing his sentences from an indeterminate term of 15 years to lifeimprisonment to an indeterminate term of 3½ to 7 years of imprisonment on the count ofburglary in the third degree and from an indeterminate term of 15 years to life imprisonment toan indeterminate term of 3½ to 7 years of imprisonment on the count of criminalpossession of a weapon in the third degree, to run concurrently with each other.

The totality of the evidence adduced at the persistent felony offender hearing, althoughwarranting the defendant's adjudication as a second felony offender, did not warrant hisadjudication as a persistent felony offender (see Penal Law § 70.10 [2]; People v Greene, 57 AD3d 1004 [2008]). Accordingly, we reduce the sentences imposed for burglary in the third degree andcriminal possession of a weapon in the third [*2]degree—both class D felonies—to concurrentindeterminate terms of imprisonment of 3½ to 7 years, which is the maximum permissiblesentence for a second felony offender convicted of those crimes (see Penal Law §70.06 [3] [d]).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit, do not require reversal, or need notbe reached in light of our determination. Mastro, J.P., Fisher, Miller and Carni, JJ., concur.


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