| Goldschmidt v Ford St., LLC |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 00505 [58 AD3d 803] |
| January 27, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Alexandr Goldschmidt et al., Respondents, v Ford Street,LLC, et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Jonathan S. Roller, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondents.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for trespass to real property, and pursuant toRPAPL article 15 to quiet title to real property, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief,from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Knipel, J.), dated November 16,2007, as denied those branches of their motion which were for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint and to vacate a preliminary injunction contained in an order of the same court datedDecember 12, 2005.
Ordered that the order dated November 16, 2007, is reversed insofar as appealed from, onthe law, with costs, and those branches of the defendants' motion which were for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint and to vacate a preliminary injunction contained in the orderdated December 12, 2005, are granted.
The plaintiffs and the defendant Ford Street, LLC (hereinafter Ford), own neighboringresidential lots in Brooklyn. For more than 10 years prior to the commencement of this action, afence has separated the driveways of these lots. The fence currently in place was installed in2001 jointly by the plaintiffs and Ford's predecessors in title, and replaced an old fence whichwas located in the same place.
In 2004 Ford purchased its lot and thereafter learned that its property line extendedapproximately eight inches beyond the fence and into the plaintiffs' driveway. After discoveringnails driven into the driveway to mark a boundary line, the plaintiffs commenced the instantaction against Ford and two other entities allegedly involved in an ongoing construction project,Executive Partners, LLC (hereafter Executive), and Klondike Construction Corp. (hereafterKlondike), claiming title to the eight-inch strip of land by adverse possession. The defendantsmoved, inter alia, [*2]for summary judgment dismissing theadverse possession cause of action on the ground that the plaintiffs could not establish theelements of claim of right and hostility, and that the plaintiffs did not cultivate or improve theproperty. The plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on their adverse possession cause ofaction. The Supreme Court denied both that branch of the defendants' motion which was forsummary judgment dismissing the adverse possession cause of action and the cross motion.
A party seeking to obtain title by adverse possession must prove by clear and convincingevidence the following common-law requirements of adverse possession: (1) that the possessionwas hostile and under claim of right; (2) that it was actual; (3) that it was open and notorious, (4)that it was exclusive; (5) and that it was continuous for the statutory period of 10 years (see DuMaurier v Lindsay-BushwickAssoc., L.P., 39 AD3d 460 [2007]; Hall v Sinclaire, 35 AD3d 660 [2006]). Additionally, where theadverse possession is not founded upon a written instrument, as in the instant case, the possessormust also establish that the disputed property was either "usually cultivated or improved" or"protected by a substantial inclosure" (RPAPL 522; see Hall v Sinclaire, 35 AD3d 660 [2006]).
The defendants presented evidence establishing, prima facie, that the plaintiffs cannotprevail on their adverse possession claim, and the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of factin opposition. Specifically, the plaintiffs had cooperated with Ford's predecessors in title inconstructing and maintaining the fence separating the plaintiffs' driveway from the remainder ofFord's lot. Thus, the plaintiffs' possession of the strip of land was not "hostile," as the consensualuse of the area in question belies the plaintiffs' assertion that the possession constitutes an actualinvasion of or infringement on the owner's rights. "When permission can be implied from thebeginning, adverse possession will not arise until there is a distinct assertion of a right hostile tothe owner" (Koudellou v Sakalis,29 AD3d 640, 641 [2006]; Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar v 26 Adar N.B. Corp.,192 AD2d 501 [1993]). Here, the cooperative conduct of the parties over the years wasconsistent with the possessor's acknowledgment of Ford's predecessors' title (cf. Walling v Przybylo, 7 NY3d228 [2006]).
Consequently, the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the defendants' motionwhich was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
In light of the foregoing, the parties' remaining contentions have been rendered academicand thus need not be reached. Spolzino, J.P., Angiolillo, Dickerson and Belen, JJ., concur.