| People v Morales |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 00564 [58 AD3d 873] |
| January 27, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Alexander Morales, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Sholom J. Twersky,and Jonathan D. Martin of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Reichbach,J.), rendered June 22, 2006, convicting him of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in thefirst degree, sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts), assault in the second degree, burglaryin the first degree, robbery in the second degree, and criminal possession of stolen property inthe fifth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review thedenial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were tosuppress physical evidence and identification testimony.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The police received a report of a robbery in progress, which described the perpetrator as amale Hispanic, short, heavyset, and wearing a gray sweatshirt and baggy pants. Within a fewminutes, and only one block from the reported crime, the police saw the defendant, who matchedthe description and was the only pedestrian in the vicinity, walking quickly away from thebuilding where the crime reportedly was committed. When the police ordered the defendant tostop, he did not comply, but increased his pace. A police officer then brought the defendant tothe ground and saw women's jewelry hanging out of his pocket. When an officer asked thedefendant if the jewelry was his, the defendant answered that it was not and added that he did notknow whose it was. The police handcuffed the [*2]defendant andbrought him to the address where the crime was alleged to have been committed. The victim,about to be removed from the scene in an ambulance, identified the defendant as the perpetrator.Following a hearing, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, and he wasthereafter convicted following a trial. On appeal, the defendant argues that his suppressionmotion should have been granted. We disagree.
The police may forcibly stop a person when they have reasonable suspicion that the personhas committed or is about to commit a crime (see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223[1976]). Given that the defendant matched the description provided in the radio run of thealleged perpetrator of a robbery committed shortly before and in close proximity to the locationat which the police encountered him, and that he was walking away from the scene of the crimeand refused to stop, the police had reasonable suspicion to stop him (see People v Gilyard, 32 AD3d1046 [2006]; People v Green,10 AD3d 664 [2004]). Moreover, inasmuch as the reported crime was a robbery and,following the stop, the defendant claimed not to know who owned the women's jewelry he wascarrying in his pocket, reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause to arrest (see Peoplev Elmore, 236 AD2d 851 [1997]), and the police were justified in then transporting thedefendant one block to the scene of the crime for the prompt show-up identification (seePeople v Brnja, 50 NY2d 366 [1980]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendant's omnibusmotion which were to suppress physical evidence and identification testimony. Fisher, J.P.,Miller, Carni and Balkin, JJ., concur.