| Daley v County of Erie |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 00928 [59 AD3d 1087] |
| February 6, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Patrick L. Daley, Respondent, v County of Erie,Appellant. |
—[*1] Chiacchia & Fleming, LLP, Hamburg (Christen Archer Pierrot of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Frank A. Sedita, Jr., J.), enteredDecember 19, 2007 in an action for, inter alia, breach of contract. The order denied the motion ofdefendant to dismiss the complaint.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff, an employee of defendant, commenced this action seeking damagesfor, inter alia, breach of contract based on the alleged violation by defendant of its EmployeeSuggestion Program (Program). The Program provided monetary awards to employees whosubmitted cost-saving suggestions that were implemented by defendant. Contrary to thecontention of defendant, Supreme Court properly denied its motion seeking to dismiss thecomplaint for, inter alia, failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Indetermining whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, a court is required to "accept thefacts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible favorableinference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory"(Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d481, 484 [1980]). "It is well[ ]established that the processing of a suggestion pursuant to anemployee suggestion plan creates a contractual relationship between the employee and theemployer under the rules of the plan" (Didley v General Motors Corp., 837 F Supp 535,539 [1993]; see deCiutiis v Nynex Corp., 1996 WL 512150,*3, 1996 US Dist LEXIS13122, *10-11 [SD NY 1996]; see also Milich v Schenley Indus., 54 AD2d 659[1976], affd 42 NY2d 952 [1977]; Streeter v Eastman Kodak Co., 251 AD2d1064 [1998]). Thus, the court properly determined that plaintiff stated a cause of action forbreach of contract (see Furia v Furia, 116 AD2d 694, 695 [1986]).
Defendant also contended in support of its motion that this action is time-barred because it isproperly a proceeding under CPLR article 78 and thus is barred by the four-month statute oflimitations. We reject that contention. "The proper vehicle for seeking damages arising from analleged breach of contract by a . . . governmental body is an action for breach ofcontract, not a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78" (Kerlikowske v City of Buffalo,305 AD2d 997, 997 [2003]; see Matter of [*2]Steve's StarServ. v County of Rockland, 278 AD2d 498, 499-500 [2000]; Matter of Barrier MotorFuels v Boardman, 256 AD2d 405, 405-406 [1998]).
We have considered defendant's remaining contention and conclude that it is without merit.Present—Martoche, J.P., Smith, Centra, Green and Pine, JJ.