| People v Merante |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 00994 [59 AD3d 207] |
| February 10, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v SalMerante, Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Nikki D. Woods of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Thomas Farber, J.), rendered February 9, 2006,convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of grand larceny in the third degree, and sentencing himto an unconditional discharge, unanimously affirmed.
The verdict was based upon legally sufficient evidence. The evidence established thatdefendant agreed to permit a car to be stored on his property, and that he also agreed that hewould have no authority to move the car; instead, the owner's sister would be contacted to movethe car if necessary. The evidence also established that defendant (in his own words to theinvestigating officer) "got rid of the car" by giving it to an accomplice. This evidence supportedthe inference of larcenous intent (see Penal Law § 155.05 [1]; § 155.00 [3],[4]; People v Kirnon, 39 AD2d 666, 667 [1972], affd 31 NY2d 877 [1972];cf. People v Tse, 261 AD2d 309 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1006[1999]), and satisfied all the elements of larceny. Defendant's present assertion that he had thecar moved off his property for legitimate purposes is unsupported by any evidence, as well asbeing undermined by his own trial testimony.
The testimony of the People's expert clearly supported the conclusion that the value of thecar at the time it was taken exceeded the $3,000 threshold for third-degree grand larceny.Defendant's other arguments relating to legal sufficiency are both unpreserved and without merit.
The court properly admitted evidence that defendant's accomplice demanded that the owner'ssister pay him money to obtain the return of the car. This was not offered for its truth, but as averbal act that was part of the criminal transaction (see e.g. People v Ayala, 273AD2d 40 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 863 [2000]). Accordingly, it was neither hearsaynor evidence of an uncharged crime. In its final charge, the court thoroughly instructed the juryon accomplice [*2]liability, and the absence of such a charge atthe time this evidence was introduced did not cause defendant any prejudice.Concur—Andrias, J.P., Nardelli, Catterson, Acosta and DeGrasse, JJ.