Bellassai v Roberts Wesleyan Coll.
2009 NY Slip Op 01029 [59 AD3d 1125]
February 11, 2009
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 1, 2009


Robin E. Bellassai et al., Appellants, v Roberts Wesleyan College,Respondent and Third-Party Plaintiff. Sodexho Marriott Management, Inc., Third-PartyDefendant-Respondent.

[*1]Finucane and Hartzell, LLP, Pittsford (Leo G. Finucane of counsel), forplaintiffs-appellants.

Law Office of Laurie G. Ogden, Rochester (Louise A. Boillat of counsel), fordefendant-respondent.

Fix Spindelman Brovitz & Goldman, P.C., Fairport (Roy Z. Rotenberg of counsel), forthird-party defendant-respondent.

Appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Monroe County(Thomas A. Stander, J.), entered August 22, 2007 in a personal injury action. The order andjudgment granted the motions of defendant and third-party defendant for summary judgment anddismissed the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order and judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmedwithout costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages for injuries sustained byRobin E. Bellassai (plaintiff), an employee of third-party defendant, when she slipped and fell onthe wet floor of a dining hall on defendant's campus. We conclude that Supreme Court properlygranted the motion of defendant, joined in by third-party defendant, for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint. Those parties met their " 'burden of establishing that [defendant] didnot create the dangerous condition that caused plaintiff to fall and did not have actual orconstructive notice thereof' " (Wesolekv Jumping Cow Enters., Inc., 51 AD3d 1376, 1377 [2008]; see generally Fasolino vCharming Stores, 77 NY2d 847 [1991]; Gordon v American Museum of NaturalHistory, 67 NY2d 836, 837-838 [1986]). "Plaintiffs' speculation with respect to the source ofthe [wetness] and the length of time it was on the floor is insufficient to raise a triable issue offact" to defeat the motions (Anthony vWegmans Food Mkts., Inc., 11 AD3d 953, 954 [2004]). Further, defendant's alleged "'general awareness' that a dangerous condition may be present [on [*2]the floor in the area of plaintiff's fall] is legally insufficient toconstitute notice of the particular condition that caused plaintiff's fall" (Piacquadio v RecineRealty Corp., 84 NY2d 967, 969 [1994]; see generally Gallais-Pradal v YWCA of Brooklyn, 33 AD3d 660[2006]; Palermo v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, N.Y., 20 AD3d 516[2005]). For the same reason, there is no merit to plaintiffs' further contention that a prior lawsuitconcerning a slip-and-fall allegedly caused by wetness in a different portion of the dining hallseveral years before plaintiff's accident was sufficient to provide notice of the condition at issuein this case. Present—Smith, J.P., Centra, Fahey, Green and Pine, JJ.


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