| People v Watkins |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 01032 [59 AD3d 1128] |
| February 11, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John C.Watkins, Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael C. Green, District Attorney, Rochester (Elizabeth Clifford of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Dennis M. Kehoe, J.), rendered June16, 2005. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of aweapon in the third degree (two counts).
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him after a jury trial of twocounts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (Penal Law § 265.02 [former(1), (4)]). We reject defendant's contention that the conviction is not supported by legallysufficient evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Thetestimony of the People's principal witness did not require corroboration inasmuch as there is noevidence that the witness shared defendant's criminal intent or, indeed, was aware that defendantpossessed a weapon in the trunk of the vehicle owned and driven by defendant (see CPL60.22 [1], [2]; see generally People v Jones, 73 NY2d 902 [1989], rearg denied74 NY2d 651 [1989]). We agree with defendant that the police lacked probable cause for hiswarrantless arrest and that County Court (John J. Connell, J.) thus erred in refusing to suppresshis statement to the police that followed the illegal arrest (see People v Ortiz, 31 AD3d 1112, 1113-1114 [2006], lvdenied 7 NY3d 869 [2006]; People v Williams, 191 AD2d 989, 990 [1993], lvdenied 82 NY2d 729 [1993]). We conclude, however, that the error is harmless beyond areasonable doubt inasmuch as there is no reasonable possibility that the error might havecontributed to the conviction (see generally People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237[1975]). The statement in question was exculpatory and, in any event, it was cumulative of otherevidence at the trial (see People vHernandez, 43 AD3d 1412, 1413 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1034 [2008];see generally People v Smith, 97 NY2d 324, 330 [2002]).
Finally, we conclude that County Court (Dennis M. Kehoe, J.) properly denied defendant'schallenge for cause to a prospective juror. Initially, we note that the contention of defendant isproperly before us because he exercised a peremptory challenge to the prospective juror andthereafter exhausted his peremptory challenges before jury selection was completed (seePeople v Nicholas, 98 NY2d 749, 752 [2002]). We reject that contention, however, becausethe relationship of the prospective juror with one of the People's witnesses was not " 'of suchnature that it [was] likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict' " (People vPickren, 284 [*2]AD2d 727, 727 [2001], lv denied96 NY2d 923 [2001], quoting CPL 270.20 [1] [c]; cf. People v Branch, 46 NY2d645, 651 [1979]; see generally People v Provenzano, 50 NY2d 420, 424 [1980]).Although the prospective juror's statements concerning that witness demonstrated "a state ofmind likely to preclude impartial service," the prospective juror was able to "give unequivocalassurance [that he could] set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on theevidence" (People v Johnson, 94 NY2d 600, 614 [2000]; see People v Horsey, 45 AD3d1378, 1379 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 766 [2008]). Present—Hurlbutt, J.P.,Martoche, Smith, Centra and Peradotto, JJ.