| Matter of Union-Endicott Cent. School Dist. (Endicott Teachers'Assn.) |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 01060 [59 AD3d 799] |
| February 11, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Arbitration between Union-Endicott CentralSchool District et al., Respondents, and Endicott Teachers' Association, on Behalf of JoannePeters, Appellant. |
—[*1] Law Firm of Frank W. Miller, East Syracuse (Frank W. Miller of counsel), forrespondents.
Stein, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Lebous, J.), entered February 11, 2008in Broome County, which, among other things, granted petitioners' application pursuant to CPLR7503 to permanently stay arbitration between the parties.
Petitioners and respondent entered into a collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter CBA)for the benefit of petitioners' employees and respondent's members. Joanne Peters was a memberof respondent by virtue of her employment as a teacher for petitioner Union-Endicott CentralSchool District. In or about December 2006, petitioners began to investigate allegations thatPeters was stealing school property and materials and selling same on the Internet. In March2007, as the investigation was nearing its conclusion—but prior to charges beingfiled—Peters submitted a letter to petitioner Board of Education of the Union-EndicottCentral School District indicating her intent to retire, contingent on receiving certain health anddental benefits pursuant to the CBA. Within a few weeks thereafter, Peters was arrested andcharged with grand larceny based on the same conduct being investigated by petitioners.Petitioners also placed her on [*2]suspension and subsequentlyfiled administrative disciplinary charges against her pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a.In view of these developments, petitioners decided to delay the processing of Peters' retirementand request for retiree benefits pending a resolution of the charges against her. Respondent fileda grievance on behalf of Peters and a demand for arbitration of petitioners' refusal to process herretirement and provide the bargained-for benefits, prompting petitioners to commence thisproceeding seeking an order permanently staying arbitration. Respondent cross-petitioned tocompel arbitration. Supreme Court granted petitioners' application for a permanent stay ofarbitration and dismissed respondent's cross petition. Respondent now appeals and we affirm.
In determining whether a matter is arbitrable, the court must undertake a two-step inquiry(see Matter of Vestal Cent. School Dist.[Vestal Teachers Assn.], 2 AD3d 1190, 1191 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 708[2004]). The first inquiry is whether the Taylor Law (see Civil Service Law art 14)authorizes the arbitration of the subject matter of the dispute (see Matter of City of NewYork v Uniformed Fire Officers Assn., Local 854, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 95 NY2d 273, 280[2000]). If the court concludes that arbitration is not barred by constitutional, statutory or publicpolicy considerations, it must then determine whether the particular agreement authorizes sucharbitration (see id. at 280). Here, Supreme Court properly found no constitutional orstatutory prohibition to arbitrating the issue of whether the Board can be compelled to processPeters' retirement and, therefore, to provide her with retiree health and dental benefits pendingthe resolution of criminal and/or administrative disciplinary charges.[FN1]
We also agree with Supreme Court's determination that the arbitration at issue here is notauthorized by the terms of the CBA. A grievance subject to arbitration is defined in the CBA asan "alleged violation of the expressed written words in th[e] agreement." There is no provision inthe CBA setting forth the procedure pertaining to the initiation of retireebenefits—including the time within which petitioners must process an employee's requestfor such benefits after receiving a notice of intent to retire—or the circumstances, if any,under which petitioners may delay doing so (for example, where disciplinary proceedings are ormay be pending). Nor does the CBA provide instruction as to when an employee must beconsidered to be retired for purposes of receiving benefits thereunder. In the absence of anyprovision requiring petitioners to take action while Peters is under suspension, we find thatpetitioners' decision to delay action regarding her retirement does not violate any expressed rightbestowed by the CBA and is, therefore, not arbitrable.[FN2][*3]
We have examined respondent's remaining contentionsand find them to be unpersuasive.
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Lahtinen and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order isaffirmed, without costs.
Footnote 1: Supreme Court explicitlydeclined to address the issue of whether arbitration should be barred on public policy grounds. Inview of our determination that the CBA does not authorize the arbitration, we also need notdecide the public policy issue.
Footnote 2: In so finding, we specificallyreject respondent's argument that the issue is whether petitioners have the right to deny benefitsto Peters. Petitioners have made no such determination and, in the event benefits are ultimatelydenied, respondent may then avail itself of any applicable rights with respect thereto, includingbut not limited to any available procedures pursuant to the CBA and/or CPLR article 78.