Ostrowska v Ostrowski
2009 NY Slip Op 01094 [59 AD3d 507]
February 10, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 1, 2009


Jolanta Ostrowska, Respondent,
v
Bogdan Ostrowski,Appellant.

[*1]Bogdan Ostrowski, Brooklyn, N.Y., appellant pro se.

Cantor, Coscia and Schustal, LLP, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Randy C. Schustal of counsel), forrespondent.

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated September 20,2006, the defendant former husband appeals, as limited by his brief, from (1) so much of anorder of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Prus, J.), dated April 16, 2007, as granted thatbranch of the motion of the plaintiff former wife which was for permission to exercise her rightof first refusal to purchase the defendant's interest in the marital residence which was granted toher in a prior order of the same court dated October 20, 2006, and denied his cross motion, interalia, to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel, (2) stated portions of an order of the same court datedJuly 3, 2007, which, after a hearing, inter alia, directed him to pay to the plaintiff an attorney'sfee in the amount of $3,500.

Ordered that the orders dated April 16, 2007 and July 3, 2007 are affirmed insofar asappealed from, with one bill of costs.

In an order dated October 20, 2006 the Supreme Court directed that the marital residence beoffered for sale through a named real estate broker, and granted the plaintiff the right of firstrefusal upon the presentation of a bona fide offer. No appeal was taken from that order.Accordingly, the question of whether the plaintiff should have been granted a right of firstrefusal is not reviewable on the instant appeal (see Cardinal Holdings v Chandre Corp.,302 AD2d 550 [2003]).

Thereafter, the named real estate broker received an offer in the sum of $470,000 and [*2]recommended acceptance of that offer based upon "current marketconditions." Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffpermission to purchase the property for $470,000 (see Jones v Jones, 182 AD2d 674[1992]; cf. Opperisano vOpperisano, 35 AD3d 686 [2006]).

Furthermore, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiffthe sum of $3,500 as an attorney's fee (see DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879,881 [1987]).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Skelos, Balkin andChambers, JJ., concur.


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