| Rigney v Ichabod Crane Cent. School Dist. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 01274 [59 AD3d 842] |
| February 19, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Michele Rigney et al., Appellants, v Ichabod Crane Central SchoolDistrict, Respondent. |
—[*1] Rapport, Meyers, Whitbeck, Shaw & Rodenhausen, L.L.P., Hudson (Larissa C. Wasyl ofcounsel), for respondent.
Rose, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Hummel, J.), entered December 3,2007 in Columbia County, which, among other things, granted defendant's motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint.
Plaintiff Michele Rigney (hereinafter plaintiff) took part in a step aerobics class offered bythe adult education program of defendant after paying a fee and executing a release in which sheagreed to hold defendant harmless for all claims arising in any way out of her participation in theclass. During one of the classes, the instructor directed class members to retrieve their exerciseequipment from a storage closet. When plaintiff did so, several weighted bars fell onto her backand injured her. Plaintiff, and her husband, derivatively, commenced this action to recover forher injuries. Defendant answered, asserted the release as its fifth affirmative defense andultimately moved for summary judgment based upon that defense. Plaintiffs cross-moved forsummary judgment as to defendant's liability and for dismissal of its fifth affirmative defense.Supreme Court granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiffs' cross motion. Plaintiffs appeal.
We find merit in plaintiffs' argument that the release is unenforceable because it did notspecifically state that plaintiff was agreeing to exempt defendant from liability arising out of itsown negligence. While "the law grudgingly accepts the proposition that [tortfeasors] may [*2]contract away their liability for negligently caused injuries, theymay do so only on the condition that their intention be expressed clearly and in 'unequivocalterms' " (Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 110 [1979], quoting Willard Van Dyke Prods.v Eastman Kodak Co., 12 NY2d 301, 305 [1963]). As a result, any agreement that purportsto release a tortfeasor from the effects of its own acts or omissions must "plainly and precisely[state] that the 'limitation of liability extends to negligence or other fault of the party attemptingto shed his [or her] ordinary responsibility' " (Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d at 107, quotingHoward v Handler Bros. & Winell, Inc., 279 App Div 72, 76 [1951], affd 303NY 990 [1952]). Releases that merely waive any and all claims arising in the future cannot beenforced because they fail to advise the signor that the waiver extends to claims that might arisefrom the defendant's own negligence (see e.g. Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 349-350 [2005],lv denied 5 NY3d 712 [2005]; Alexander v Kendall Cent. School Dist., 221AD2d 898, 899 [1995]; Long v State of New York, 158 AD2d 778, 780 [1990];Sivaslian v Rawlins, 88 AD2d 703, 703 [1982]).[FN*]
We do not agree, however, that Supreme Court erred by denying plaintiffs' cross motion forsummary judgment on liability. Triable issues of fact exist with respect to plaintiff's possibleassumption of the risk of injury and her comparative negligence in the manner in which sheaccessed the storage closet after becoming aware of its dangerous condition (see e.g. Pantalone v Talcott, 52 AD3d1148, 1149 [2008]; E.B. Metal & Rubber Indus. v County of Washington, 102AD2d 599, 602-603 [1984]).
Cardona, P.J., Kane and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law,without costs, by reversing so much thereof as granted defendant's motion for summaryjudgment and denied that part of plaintiffs' cross motion seeking dismissal of defendant's fifthaffirmative defense; defendant's motion denied, plaintiffs' cross motion granted to said extentand defendant's fifth affirmative defense dismissed; and, as so modified, affirmed.
Footnote *: Inasmuch as GeneralObligations Law § 5-326 extends only to those "covenant[s], agreement[s] orunderstanding[s] . . . which exempt[ ] the said owner or operator from liability fordamages caused by or resulting from the negligence of the owner, operator or person in charge ofsuch establishment, or their agents, servants or employees," and because we agree with plaintiffsthat the release here does not do so, the statute is inapplicable and provides no support forplaintiffs' alternate contention that the release is void under its provisions.