Matter of Lamantia v Midland El. Co., Inc.
2009 NY Slip Op 01379 [59 AD3d 892]
February 26, 2009
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 1, 2009


In the Matter of the Claim of Robert Lamantia, Respondent, vMidland Elevator Company, Inc., et al., Appellants. Workers' Compensation Board,Respondent.

—[*1]Gregory J. Allen, State Insurance Fund, Melville (Janis M. Riekstins of counsel), forappellants.

Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, New York City (Iris Steel of counsel), for Workers'Compensation Board, respondent.

Stein, J. Appeals from a decision and an amended decision of the Workers' CompensationBoard, filed July 27, 2007 and July 9, 2008, which ruled that claimant's schedule loss of useaward is not subject to a nonschedule award to claimant in another workers' compensation case.

Claimant filed two separate claims for workers' compensation benefits in March 2005. Oneclaim was for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and the other was related to a back injury. AWorkers' Compensation Law Judge (hereinafter WCLJ) found that a compensable back injury ofa temporary nature existed and awarded claimant a nonschedule temporary disability award atthe maximum benefit rate of $400 per week commencing March 21, 2005. On the same day theback injury was established, the WCLJ found prima facie evidence related to the carpal tunnelclaim, but made no award at that time. The award for claimant's back injury was thereafterperiodically extended throughout the next two years, without change. In February 2007, a WCLJdetermined that claimant was entitled to a schedule loss of use award based upon his originalcarpal tunnel claim. This award entitled claimant to 70.15 weeks of benefits over the period of[*2]March 10, 2005 to July 14, 2006 at $400 per week. On thesame day, the WCLJ determined that claimant was permanently partially disabled due to hisestablished back injury and continued the maximum benefit of $400 per week for life.

The State Insurance Fund—the employer's workers' compensationcarrier—applied for review, arguing that the February 2007 awards resulted in an overlap,impermissibly enabling claimant to collect weekly compensation of $800 per week, or doublethe statutorily allowed maximum under Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (6), for the timeperiod of March 21, 2005 through July 14, 2006. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmedthe awards, first on July 27, 2007, and again in an amended decision on July 9, 2008. In the July2008 decision, the Board panel determined that there was no impermissible overlap of theschedule loss of use award for carpal tunnel syndrome and the nonschedule permanent disabilityaward for the back injury because claimant was not classified as permanently disabled until 2007and, therefore, during the time in which both the schedule award and the nonschedule award ran(March 21, 2005 to July 14, 2006), the nonschedule award was for a temporarydisability. The employer and the State Insurance Fund now appeal. Because we agree that thecombined schedule and nonschedule awards would result in claimant receiving more than theweekly maximum allowed pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (6), we reverse.

Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (6) provides, as relevant here, that compensation fordisability due to an accident or disablement resulting from an occupational disease occurringbetween July 1, 1992 and July 1, 2007 shall not exceed $400 per week. We begin our analysis ofwhether the awards here are violative of that limitation with a review of the distinction betweenthe nature of the awards in question. "When an award is based on a finding of permanentdisability, the benefit is intended to recompense a claimant for the loss of . . . his orher earning capacity on a permanent basis—i.e., without respect to any particular timeframe" (Matter of Miller v NorthSyracuse Cent. School Dist., 1 AD3d 691, 692 [2003]; see Matter of Soper vGouverneur Talc Co., 243 AD2d 1001, 1002-1003 [1997]; Matter of Salvet v UnionCarbide Linde Div., 135 AD2d 965, 966 [1987]). Similarly, the purpose of a schedule loss ofuse award is to " 'compensate for loss of earning power' " (Matter of LaCroix v Syracuse Exec. Air Serv., Inc., 8 NY3d 348,353 [2007], quoting Matter of Marhoffer v Marhoffer, 220 NY 543, 547 [1917]). Assuch, a schedule award "is not allocable to any particular time frame" (Matter of Miller vNorth Syracuse Cent. School Dist., 1 AD3d at 693), is "independent of the time an employeeactually loses from work . . . [and] may not be viewed as including a specific periodof disability" (id. at 692 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). On the otherhand, a temporary disability award is intended to compensate the claimant for a "temporary lossof wages during a specific period of time" (Matter of LaCroix v Syracuse Exec. Air Serv.,Inc., 8 NY3d at 357).

In view of these distinctions, we have held that a schedule loss of use award may be paidconcurrently with a temporary disability award where the aggregate award exceeds themaximum without running afoul of Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (6) (see Matter of Lansberry vCarbide/Graphite Group, Inc., 28 AD3d 1031, 1032-1033 [2006]; Matter of Miller vNorth Syracuse Cent. School Dist., 1 AD3d at 692-693). However, a contrary result isnecessarily reached where a schedule loss of use award made concurrent to a nonschedule awardfor permanent disability exceeds the statutory maximum amount, inasmuch as bothawards are intended to compensate the claimant for the loss of future earning capacity, not for aloss of income during a finite period (see Matter of Salvet v Union Carbide Linde Div.,135 AD2d at 966-967; see also Matter of Soper v Gouverneur Talc Co., 243 AD2d at1002). Under these [*3]circumstances, the nonschedule awardensures that the claimant will be fully compensated for the loss of his or her earning capacity(see Matter of Soper v Gouverneur Talc Co., 243 AD2d at 1002-1003).

Here, the schedule loss of use award was granted on the same day that claimant'snonschedule injury was classified as permanent. Contrary to the Board's interpretation, since"payment of the schedule award is not allocable to any particular period of disability"(Matter of Lynch v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 1 AD2d 362, 365 [1956],affd 3 NY2d 871 [1957]; accord Matter of LaCroix v Syracuse Exec. Air Serv.,Inc., 8 NY3d at 356), the time period cited in the schedule award (in relation to the timewhen the back injury was classified as permanent) is not determinative of whether itimpermissibly overlaps with the nonschedule award. Inasmuch as the nonschedule awardeventually became classified as permanent and provides claimant with the maximum allowedpayment of $400 per week for life, the schedule loss of use award must be reconsidered, asclaimant is now "entitled to no more" (Matter of Soper v Gouverneur Talc Co., 243AD2d at 1003). This determination is without prejudice to reconsideration if there should be achange in claimant's disability status (see id.).

Peters, J.P., Lahtinen and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision and amendeddecision are reversed, without costs, and matter remitted to the Workers' Compensation Boardfor further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.


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