| People v Ramirez |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 01535 [60 AD3d 415] |
| March 3, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v JoseRamirez, Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York (Marc Krupnick of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgments, Supreme Court, New York County (Arlene R. Silverman, J.), renderedSeptember 13, 2006, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of robbery in the second degree,assault in the second degree and bribing a witness, and also convicting him, upon his plea ofguilty, of two counts of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, andsentencing him, as a persistent violent felony offender, to an aggregate term of 18 years to life,unanimously affirmed.
The court's Sandoval ruling balanced the appropriate factors and was a properexercise of discretion (see People v Hayes, 97 NY2d 203 [2002]; People vWalker, 83 NY2d 455, 458-459 [1994]; People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 292 [1983]).The convictions that the court permitted the People to elicit were all highly relevant todefendant's credibility, even though one of them was somewhat similar to one of the chargedcrimes, and they were not excessively numerous or remote.
The court properly exercised its discretion when it slightly modified its Sandovalruling as a result of defendant's testimony. On direct and cross-examination, defendantpersistently made unnecessary references to his having pleaded guilty in other cases. Althoughhe did not state it directly, it was clear that the point he was trying to make was that whenever hewas guilty of a crime in the past he would plead guilty, so that the absence of a guilty plea in thiscase implied his innocence. Defendant thus opened the door to limited cross-examinationtending to show that certain guilty pleas were motivated by a desire to avoid conviction of moreserious charges (see People v Cooper, 92 NY2d 968 [1998]). In any event, the differencebetween the information permitted under the original Sandoval ruling and theinformation ultimately elicited was minimal.
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of theevidence. The evidence amply supported the physical injury element of second-degree robbery(see People v Chiddick, 8 NY3d445 [2007]; People v Guidice, 83 NY2d 630, 636 [1994]; People v James, 2 AD3d 291[2003]).
Defendant's remaining argument is without merit. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Friedman,Buckley, Catterson and Acosta, JJ.