| People v Hayes |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 01546 [60 AD3d 1097] |
| March 5, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kareem Y.Hayes, Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Philip W. Mueller of counsel), forrespondent.
Kavanagh, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Hoye,J.), rendered January 25, 2007, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes ofmurder in the second degree (two counts) and burglary in the second degree (two counts).
On January 16, 2006, the mutilated remains of Hillary Downey (hereinafter the victim) andher 13-month-old son were discovered by police in her apartment in the City of Schenectady,Schenectady County. The victim had been strangled and stabbed 33 times in the neck and chestwhile her son sustained multiple stab wounds to the chest and heart. Defendant was subsequentlycharged by indictment with their murders and the burglary of the victim's apartment. He was alsocharged with the commission of two other burglaries—one that had occurred at thevictim's apartment two weeks earlier on January 1, 2006 and an unrelated residential burglarythat occurred on January 3, 2006.[FN1]After defendant's motion to suppress [*2]incriminatingstatements he made was denied, he pleaded guilty to two counts each of murder in the seconddegree and burglary in the second degree and was subsequently sentenced as a second felonyoffender to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 50 years to life.[FN2]He now appeals, claiming that statements he made to the police were obtained after he had beenillegally detained and should have been suppressed. Defendant also argues that the sentence hereceived was unduly harsh and excessive and should, in the interest of justice, be reduced. Forreasons that follow, we reject each of these claims and now affirm.
The relevant facts as they relate to the decision by the police to detain defendant and placehim under arrest are not in dispute. On the morning of January 16, 2006, Police OfficersMarisela Mosher and Michael Crounse were dispatched to the victim's residence as the result ofa phone call received by the Schenectady Police Department from her boyfriend to the effect thathe had not been able to contact the victim for several days and feared for her safety.[FN3]Two weeks earlier, Mosher had been to the same apartment to investigate a complaint by thevictim that her apartment had been burglarized and some of her belongings had been stolen.Mosher recalled that the victim, who lived alone in the apartment with her infant son, had at thattime identified defendant as the person she believed to have committed the burglary.
When Mosher and her partner arrived at the apartment, they received no response to theirknocks and calls at the door. They found that all of the doors to the apartment were locked and,during a check of the exterior of the premises, found no sign of forced entry. Mosher did note thepresence of fresh footprints in the snow leading to a window on the side of the apartment. Priorto returning to police headquarters, Mosher had the department dispatcher place a telephone callto the victim's home phone number. Not only was there no answer, but the dispatcher reportednot being able to leave a message on the answering machine because it was full.
Later that same day, unaware that the police had been to the premises, the victim's brotherand stepfather went to the apartment to look for her because they had not heard from her inseveral days and were concerned for her welfare. After receiving no response from inside theapartment, both men decided to force their way into the apartment through a side window. Asthey sought to pry open the window, they were suddenly confronted by an unknown man whocame to the window from inside the apartment. When this individual refused to come outside theapartment or allow the victim's relatives to enter, both men went to police headquarters forassistance. After filing a complaint, the victim's relatives were instructed by the police to returnto her residence to await the arrival of a patrol car.
Mosher and her partner were again dispatched to the victim's apartment after having beennotified that the victim's relatives had just reported seeing the man leave the apartment carryingtwo suitcases. A description was given of the man and his approximate location. Moments later,Mosher saw defendant walking with two suitcases a short distance from the [*3]victim's apartment. Mosher noted that defendant fit the descriptionof the man seen leaving the apartment and recognized him as the individual the victim hadsuspected of burglarizing her apartment two weeks earlier.
As Mosher approached defendant, the victim's relatives arrived on the scene, got out of theirvehicle and attempted to talk with defendant. The officers first stopped the victim's relativesfrom approaching defendant and then asked defendant for identification, as well as anexplanation as to why he was in the victim's apartment. Mosher noted that despite the frigidtemperatures, defendant was "sweating really badly." In response to Mosher's questions,defendant stated that he was coming from his girlfriend's apartment and that she was at a localshopping mall. Mosher then told defendant that no one had heard from the victim or had seen heror her child for several days and that he had been previously identified by the victim as a suspectin a burglary of her apartment. Mosher informed defendant that he would be required to returnwith the police to the victim's apartment and that if he refused, he would be charged with"obstruction." Defendant, prior to being placed in the police car, was searched and a large knifewas recovered from his pants. He was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained.
Once inside the patrol car, defendant abruptly told Mosher that she should take him directlyto jail. When Mosher asked, "Why, what's wrong, tell me?", defendant stated, "She's dead!" Enroute to the victim's apartment, Mosher radioed for emergency medical assistance and askeddefendant about the condition of the infant. In response, defendant simply replied, "Dead." Whenthey arrived at the premises, Mosher used a key—given to her by defendant—togain entry to the apartment and, at that time, discovered the remains of both victims. Defendantwas brought to police headquarters where he was advised of his Miranda rights and gavetwo statements that were reduced to writing, in which he confessed to the murder of the victimand her son.
Defendant concedes that the police were initially justified in stopping him and asking himfor identification, but claims they did not, on the facts presented, have the right to inquire furtherbecause "a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot" did not exist (People v DeBour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]). He claims that compelling him to enter the patrol carconstituted an illegal restraint on his liberty, and that any statements subsequently attributed tohim by the police were the product of that illegal detention and should have been suppressed. Wedisagree.
When Mosher first confronted defendant, she not only recognized him as the man the victimbelieved had previously burglarized her apartment, but also knew that only moments earlier,defendant had been seen leaving the victim's apartment with two suitcases. The police were alsoaware that defendant had been seen earlier that day inside the victim's apartment by her relativesand had refused to allow them to enter. Moreover, defendant's own erratic and somewhat bizarrebehavior when first confronted by the police and his claim that the victim was his "girlfriend,"simply served to reinforce Mosher's suspicion that criminality was afoot (see People v DeBour, 40 NY2d at 223) and that a serious crime had been committed (see People v Lee, 6 AD3d 751,753 [2004]; People v Shakur, 233 AD2d 793, 795 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d1041 [1997]). Taken as an integrated whole, these facts undeniably establish that when Mosherdecided to detain defendant, she had probable cause to believe that he had committed a burglaryof the victim's apartment and was fleeing the scene when stopped by the police (see e.g.People v Hicks, 68 NY2d 234, 238 [1986]; People v Tillman, 57 AD3d 1021, 1022-1023 [2008]; People v [*4]McNair, 36 AD3d 1073, 1075 [2007], lv denied 9NY3d 847 [2007]; People v Lewis, 287 AD2d 888, 889 [2001], lv denied 97NY2d 684 [2001]). As such, the decision to detain defendant and take him into custody had alawful basis and his motion to suppress the statements he subsequently made on the ground thatthey were the product of an illegal detention was properly denied.
Further, we disagree that any statements made by defendant while in the patrol car shouldbeen suppressed because he had not been given his Miranda warnings. Viewed in theirproper context, the only questions put to defendant while in the patrol car were investigatory innature and came in response to his spontaneous declaration that he should be taken to jail. Eachquestion was part of Mosher's ongoing effort to make an accurate assessment of what appearedto be an emergent situation and, as posed, each question was obviously designed to aid her infashioning an appropriate response (see People v Huffman, 41 NY2d 29, 34 [1976]).Given these circumstances, Miranda warnings were not, at that time, required (see People v Naradzay, 11 NY3d460, 468 [2008]; People vBrown, 23 AD3d 1090, 1092 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 810 [2006]; Peoplev Madore, 289 AD2d 986, 986 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 757 [2002]; People vTunstall, 278 AD2d 585, 587 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 788 [2001]; People vBurnett, 228 AD2d 788, 790-791 [1996]; People v Green, 161 AD2d 359, 360[1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 857 [1990]).
After defendant was placed under arrest, he was taken to police headquarters where he wasproperly advised of his constitutional rights. After he agreed to waive these rights, defendantvoluntarily provided written statements describing the circumstances surrounding the murder ofthe victims. As such, defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied.
Finally, the sentences imposed were clearly in proportion to the heinous nature of the crimesfor which defendant stands convicted and were not, by any fair measure, either harsh orexcessive (see People v Weiskopff,20 AD3d 776, 776 [2005]; People vHaynes, 14 AD3d 789, 791 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 831 [2005]; People v Washington, 4 AD3d546, 548-549 [2004]).
Peters, J.P., Lahtinen and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Footnote 1: The 13-count indictmentcharged defendant with three counts of murder in the first degree, two counts of murder in thesecond degree, three counts of burglary in the second degree, four counts of petit larceny and onecount of criminal mischief in the fourth degree.
Footnote 2: One of the burglary counts towhich defendant pleaded guilty involved the unrelated incident that occurred on January 3, 2006and is not challenged on this appeal.
Footnote 3: The caller, Sanjulo Taylor, wasincarcerated in the Albany County Jail.