| Kaplan v County of Nassau |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 01952 [60 AD3d 816] |
| March 17, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Sandra L. Araujo Kaplan et al., Respondents, v County ofNassau et al., Appellants, and Glory E. Upke, Respondent. |
—[*1] Gair, Gair, Conason, Steigman & Mackauf, New York, N.Y. (Howard S. Hershenhorn andRhonda E. Kay of counsel), for plaintiffs-respondents.
In a consolidated action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., thedefendants County of Nassau, Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority, and William Malloy appealfrom an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Martin, J.), entered December 6, 2006,which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claimsinsofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs to the plaintiffs-respondents.
This case stems from an accident involving multiple vehicles and two pedestrians at theintersection of Jackson Street and Washington Street in Hempstead, which was governed bytraffic light signals. The decedent and her son allegedly were crossing Jackson Street in aneasterly direction when they were struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant Glory E. Upke,after that vehicle came into contact with a bus operated by the defendant William Malloy andowned by the defendant Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority. Prior to the accident, the bus wastraveling in a westerly direction on Jackson Street, and the Upke vehicle was traveling in anortherly direction on Washington Street. Malloy and Upke provided conflicting depositiontestimony as to the facts surrounding the accident, including who had the right-of-way and thespeed at which the vehicles were moving as they approached the intersection.[*2]
The defendants County of Nassau, MetropolitanSuburban Bus Authority, and William Malloy (hereinafter collectively the municipal defendants)moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as assertedagainst them, contending, inter alia, that Upke's negligence was the sole proximate cause of theaccident. The Supreme Court denied the motion and we affirm. The municipal defendants failedto submit evidence sufficient to establish, as a matter of law, that Malloy was free fromnegligence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the motion (see Vehicleand Traffic Law § 1111; Borukhow v Cuff, 48 AD3d 726 [2008]; Siegel vSweeney, 266 AD2d 200 [1999]).
The municipal defendants' remaining contentions are without merit. Prudenti, P.J., Ritter,Santucci and Chambers, JJ., concur.