| Hofmann v Town of Ashford |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 02442 [60 AD3d 1498] |
| March 27, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Kimberly Hofmann, Respondent-Appellant, et al., Plaintiff, vTown of Ashford et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,as Subrogee of George K. Hofmann, Respondent, v Town of Ashford et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Cellino & Barnes, P.C., Buffalo (John A. Sheehan of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent-appellant. Handelman, Witkowicz & Levitsky, Rochester (Eric D. Handelman of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.
Appeal and cross appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Cattaraugus County (MichaelL. Nenno, A.J.), entered February 4, 2008. The order, insofar as appealed and cross-appealedfrom, denied the motion of defendants Town of Ashford and Duane Fuller for summaryjudgment and the cross motion of plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., as subrogeeof George K. Hofmann, for partial summary judgment.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is modified on the law by granting thecross motion and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Kimberly Hofmann (Hofmann) and her husband commenced an actionagainst, inter alia, the Town of Ashford (Town) and Duane Fuller seeking damages for injuriessustained by Hofmann when a snowplow owned by the Town and operated by Fuller collidedwith Hofmann's vehicle at an intersection. Hofmann and her husband thereafter separated, andthe action commenced by Hofmann and her husband was discontinued with respect to thehusband. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., as subrogee of Hofmann's husband (State[*2]Farm), commenced an action against the Town and Fuller(collectively, defendants), and the two actions thereafter were joined for trial. Defendants made apretrial motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaints on the ground that the "recklessdisregard" standard of care pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) applies, andthey contended that they established as a matter of law that Fuller's conduct was not reckless.State Farm cross-moved for partial summary judgment seeking application of the negligencestandard of care and contending that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) is not applicableto this case. Supreme Court denied the motion and the cross motion.
We conclude that the court erred in denying State Farm's cross motion, and we thereforemodify the order accordingly. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) exempts from theprovisions of title VII of the Vehicle and Traffic Law all "persons, teams, motor vehicles, andother equipment while actually engaged in work on a highway." Such persons, teams, motorvehicles, and other equipment, however, are not relieved "from the duty to proceed at all timesduring all phases of such work with due regard for the safety of all persons nor shall theforegoing provisions protect such persons or teams or such operators of motor vehicles or otherequipment from the consequences of their reckless disregard for the safety of others"(id.). That subdivision includes snowplows (see Riley v County of Broome, 95NY2d 455, 463 [2000]).
The sole issue before us is whether Fuller was "actually engaged in work on a highway" atthe time of the collision (id.), and we conclude that he was not. Our primaryconsideration in interpreting a statute is to "ascertain and give effect to the intention of theLegislature" (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92). In addition, meaningand effect should be given to all language in a statute, if possible, and "words are not to berejected as superfluous when it is practicable to give to each a distinct and separate meaning"(Statutes § 231). Here, the inclusion of the language "actually engaged in work on ahighway" indicates that the exemption applies only when such work is in fact being performed atthe time of the accident (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 [b]). To conclude otherwisewould render superfluous the phrase "actually engaged." Here, the record establishes that, at thetime of the collision, Fuller was not driving on part of his plow route but instead was travelingfrom one part of his route to another by way of a county road that he was not responsible forplowing. Further, Fuller was driving with both blades of the snowplow raised, and was notsanding or salting the road. The exemption does not apply to a driver who is traveling from onework site to another (see Davis v Incorporated Vil. of Babylon, N.Y., 13 AD3d 331[2004]; Marvin v Town of Middlesex, 2002 NY Slip Op 50006[U] [2002], affd300 AD2d 1112 [2002]), and it likewise does not apply here. Defendants therefore arecorrect that the ordinary negligence standard of care should be applied at trial. Finally, we notethat, although State Farm did not cross-appeal from that part of the order denying its crossmotion and, instead, only Hofmann cross-appealed therefrom, " 'this is one of those cases whererelief to a nonappealing party is appropriate' " (Lakewood Constr. Co. v Brody, 1 AD3d1007, 1009 [2003]; see generally Hecht v City of New York, 60 NY2d 57, 61-62[1983]).
All concur except Scudder, P.J., and Pine, J., who dissent in part and vote to affirm in thefollowing memorandum.
Scudder, P.J., and Pine, J. (dissenting in part). We respectfully dissent in part and wouldaffirm the order denying both the motion of the Town of Ashford and Duane Fuller (collectively,defendants) and the cross motion of State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., as subrogee ofGeorge K. Hofmann. Although the majority concludes as a matter of law that the ordinarynegligence standard of care rather than the "reckless disregard" standard of care pursuant toVehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) applies herein, in our view there is an issue of factconcerning which of those two standards of care applies. The record establishes that the accidentoccurred after Fuller had plowed two town roads and was proceeding on his plow route along acounty highway in order to plow another town road that was approximately 1 to 1½ milesaway. Fuller testified at his deposition that the snowplow he was operating, with the flashinglights activated, was stopped at an [*3]intersection with a stopsign on the county highway when Fuller observed the vehicle driven by Kimberly Hofmann(Hofmann) approach the intersection from the north. Fuller observed that the right turn signal onHofmann's vehicle was activated, and Hofmann slowed as she approached the intersection.Fuller began to enter the intersection under the mistaken belief that Hofmann was turning right,whereupon Hofmann's vehicle struck the raised plow blade. The majority concludes that Fullerwas not "actually engaged in work on a highway" at the time of the collision and that defendantstherefore are not entitled to the reckless disregard standard of care pursuant to Vehicle andTraffic Law § 1103 (b). We cannot agree with that conclusion. In our view, because Fullerwas operating the vehicle in the course of his duties, i.e., he had finished plowing one road on hisroute and was proceeding to the next road assigned on his route, there is an issue of fact whetherhe was "actually engaged in work on a highway" and thus is entitled to the application of thereckless disregard standard of care at trial rather than that of ordinary negligence (id.;see O'Keeffe v State of New York, 40 AD3d 607, 608 [2007]). Indeed, the Court of Appealsin Riley v County of Broome (95 NY2d 455, 468 [2000]) has explicitly stated that "[t]hestatute does not require that a vehicle be located in a designated 'work area' in order to receivethe protection" of the reckless disregard standard of care, and we therefore conclude that theapplicable standard of care must be determined on a case-by-case basis (cf. Davis vIncorporated Vil. of Babylon, N.Y., 13 AD3d 331 [2004]; Marvin v Town ofMiddlesex, 2002 NY Slip Op 50006[U] [2002], affd 300 AD2d 1112 [2002]).Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Fahey, Peradotto and Pine, JJ.