| Magid v Lincoln Servs. Corp. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 02569 [60 AD3d 1008] |
| March 31, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Alicia Magid et al., Respondents, v Lincoln Services Corp.et al., Appellants. (And a Third-Party Action.) |
—[*1]
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), dated July 1, 2008, which denied their motionfor summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that neither of the plaintiffssustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiffs did not sustain aserious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subjectaccident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy vEyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triableissue of fact.
Initially, the records and reports of Hamilton Medical Diagnostics were without anyprobative value since they were not properly sworn or affirmed (see Grasso v Angerami,79 NY2d 813 [1991]; Luna v Mann, 58 AD3d 699 [2009]; Uribe-Zapata vCapallan, 54 AD3d 936 [2008]; Patterson v NY Alarm Response Corp., 45 AD3d656 [2007]; Verette v Zia, 44 AD3d 747 [2007]; Nociforo v Penna, 42 AD3d514 [2007]; Pagano v Kingsbury, 182 AD2d 268 [1992]).
The respective affirmations of Laxmidhar Diwan and Emmanuel Hostin failed to raise atriable issue of fact since they clearly relied on the unsworn reports of others in coming to theirconclusions (see Sorto v Morales, 55 AD3d 718 [2008]; Malave v Basikov, 45AD3d 539 [2007]; Verette v Zia, 44 [*2]AD3d 747[2007]; Furrs v Griffith, 43 AD3d 389 [2007]; see also Friedman v U-Haul TruckRental, 216 AD2d 266, 267 [1995]). While both Diwan and Hostin set forth findings thatrevealed the existence of significant limitations in each of the respective plaintiffs' range ofmotion, neither they nor the plaintiffs proffered competent admissible medical evidence thatrevealed the existence of significant limitations in the plaintiffs' ranges of motion that werecontemporaneous with the subject accident (see Leeber v Ward, 55 AD3d 563 [2008];Ferraro v Ridge Car Serv., 49 AD3d 498 [2008]; D'Onofrio v Floton, Inc., 45AD3d 525 [2007]).
The magnetic resonance imaging reports of Stephen Veigh failed to raise a triable issue offact. The mere existence of a herniated or bulging disc, or even a tear in a tendon, is not evidenceof a serious injury in the absence of objective evidence of the extent of the alleged physicallimitations resulting from the injury and its duration (see Washington v Mendoza, 57AD3d 972 [2008]; Cornelius v Cintas Corp., 50 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2008];Shvartsman v Vildman, 47 AD3d 700 [2008]; Tobias v Chupenko, 41 AD3d 583[2007]; Mejia v DeRose, 35 AD3d 407 [2006]; Yakubov v CG Trans Corp., 30AD3d 509 [2006]; Cerisier v Thibiu, 29 AD3d 507 [2006]; Bravo v Rehman, 28AD3d 694 [2006]; Kearse v New York City Tr. Auth., 16 AD3d 45 [2005]; Diaz vTurner, 306 AD2d 241 [2003]).
The plaintiffs failed to submit competent medical evidence that the injuries they allegedlysustained in the subject accident rendered them unable to perform substantially all of their usualand customary daily activities for not less than 90 days of the first 180 days subsequent to thesubject accident (see Rabolt v Park, 50 AD3d 995 [2008]; Roman v Fast Lane CarServ., Inc., 46 AD3d 535 [2007]; Sainte-Aime v Ho, 274 AD2d 569 [2000]). Skelos,J.P., Santucci, Angiolillo, Dickerson and Chambers, JJ., concur.