| Matter of Stefani C. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 02780 [61 AD3d 681] |
| April 7, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Stefani C., a Child Alleged to be Neglected.Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Oscar A., Appellant. (ProceedingNo. 1.) In the Matter of Katherine C., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Suffolk CountyDepartment of Social Services, Respondent; Oscar A., Appellant. (Proceeding No.2.) |
—[*1] Christine Malafi, County Attorney, Central Islip, N.Y. (Mary Ann Filosa of counsel), forrespondent. Robert G. Venturo, Islandia, N.Y., attorney for the children.
In two related proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the father appeals froman order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Hoffmann, J.),dated April 8, 2008, which, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, and upon a decision ofthe same court dated March 17, 2008, found that he had neglected the subject children, andincorporated by reference an order of protection against him.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.[*2]
The Family Court properly found that the petitionerestablished by a preponderance of the evidence that the father neglected the subject children. TheFamily Court's determination in a neglect proceeding where issues of credibility are presented isentitled to great deference on appeal, as the court saw and heard the witnesses (see Matter of Steven Glenn R., 51AD3d 802 [2008]). Here, the court credited the testimony of the mother regarding theincidents of domestic violence in the home, and there is no basis to disturb that determination onappeal.
The father's contention that the court erred in not modifying the dispositional order to allowhim to return to the home is without merit. The Family Court has broad discretion in enteringdispositional orders, and its determination in entering dispositional orders is entitled to greatdeference, as it has the opportunity to hear the witnesses' testimony and view their demeanor (see Matter of Javed K., 57 AD3d899 [2008]; Matter of YasinH., 31 AD3d 638 [2006]). Given the mother's testimony as to the acts of domesticviolence committed by the father, which the court credited, the court providently exercised itsdiscretion in ordering the father to stay away from the mother and the children while completingtreatment programs. The order of protection, incorporated by reference into the order ofdisposition, set forth reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed for a specified time by thefather (see Family Ct Act § 1056 [1]).
The father's remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Santucci, Dickerson andLeventhal, JJ., concur.