| Jones v LeFrance Leasing Ltd. Partnership |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 03137 [61 AD3d 824] |
| April 21, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Janice Jones et al., Respondents, v LeFrance LeasingLimited Partnership et al., Defendants, and Alliance Elevator Company,Appellant. |
—[*1] Gary B. Pillersdorf & Associates, P.C. (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & De Cicco, New York, N.Y.[Brian J. Isaac and Jillian Rosen of counsel], for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful death, the defendantAlliance Elevator Company appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of theSupreme Court, Kings County (Schack, J.), dated October 10, 2008, as, in effect, denied thatbranch of its motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to unconditionally preclude the plaintiffsfrom introducing evidence concerning item numbers 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, and 21 ofits demand for a bill of particulars.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof, in effect,denying that branch of the appellant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 tounconditionally preclude the plaintiffs from introducing evidence concerning item numbers 7,10, 15, 16, 18, 20, and 21 of its demand for a bill of particulars, and substituting therefor aprovision granting that branch of the motion to the extent of precluding the plaintiffs fromintroducing evidence concerning those items of the demand unless the plaintiffs serve a furtherbill of particulars with respect to those items; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar asappealed from, with costs to the appellant, and the plaintiffs' time to serve a further bill ofparticulars with respect to the demanded items is extended until 30 days after service upon themof a copy of this decision and order.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to amplify the pleadings, limit the proof, and preventsurprise at trial (see Valentine v Armor El. Co., 155 AD2d 597 [1989]; Ferrigno vGeneral Motors Corp., Cadillac Motor Car Div., 134 AD2d 479 [1987]). Here, the appellantwas entitled to particulars regarding the manner in which it allegedly was negligent and thealleged defect of the subject elevator (see Ramondi v Paramount Fee, LP, 30 AD3d 396 [2006];Valentine v Armor El. Co., 155 AD2d 597 [1989]), as well as specification with respectto the plaintiffs' claims concerning the creation of the allegedly dangerous condition (seeRamondi v Paramount Fee, LP, 30 AD3d at 397). Accordingly, unless the plaintiffsparticularize the specific acts of negligence which precipitated the purported defective condition,the specific defect alleged, and the creation of the alleged defective condition, as requested initems 7, 10, 15, 16, 18, 20, and 21 of the demand, they will be precluded from adducing anyevidence at trial with respect thereto (see Laukaitis v Ski Stop, 202 AD2d 554, 556[1994]; Ferrigno v General Motors Corp., 134 AD2d at 481).
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit. Spolzino, J.P., Florio, Covello andEng, JJ., concur.