| Matter of Purifoy v County of Suffolk |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 03178 [61 AD3d 873] |
| April 21, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Mozelle Purifoy, Respondent, v County ofSuffolk et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Frederick K. Brewington, Hempstead, N.Y. (Ira Fogelgaren of counsel), forrespondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave to serve a latenotice of claim, the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mayer, J.),dated June 2, 2008, which granted the petition.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with costs,and the petition is denied.
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the petition for leaveto serve a late notice of claim on the County of Suffolk. The key factors to be considered arewhether the petitioner demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely noticeof claim, whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential factsconstituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and whetherthe delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in maintaining its defense on themerits (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Termini v Valley Stream Union Free School Dist. No. 13, 2AD3d 866, 867 [2003]; Matter of DiBella v City of New York, 234 AD2d 366, 367[1996]).
The petitioner did not offer a reasonable excuse for her failure to serve a timely notice ofclaim upon the County (see Matter of Termini v Valley Stream Union Free School Dist. No.13, 2 AD3d at 867; Matter of Gilliam v City of New York, 250 AD2d 680 [1998];Matter of Embery v City of New York, 250 [*2]AD2d611 [1998]). Furthermore, the petitioner failed to establish that the County possessed any recordswhich provided the County with actual notice of the essential facts constituting her claim within90 days of its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter (see Matter of Eaddy v County ofNassau, 282 AD2d 675 [2001]; Matter of Przybyszewski v City of New York, 225AD2d 556 [1996]; Matter of Caruso v County of Westchester, 220 AD2d 746 [1995]).Moreover, the petitioner failed to establish that the 11-month delay after the expiration of the90-day statutory period would not substantially prejudice the County in maintaining a defense onthe merits (see Matter of Felice vEastport/South Manor Cent. School Dist., 50 AD3d 138, 152 [2008]; Matter ofLorseille v New York City Hous. Auth., 295 AD2d 612 [2002]; Matter of Sica v Boardof Educ. of City of N.Y., 226 AD2d 542 [1996]). Spolzino, J.P., Santucci, Angiolillo andLeventhal, JJ., concur.