Cerati v Berrios
2009 NY Slip Op 03469 [61 AD3d 915]
April 28, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 10, 2009


Maureen Cerati, Respondent,
v
Oscar I. Berrios et al.,Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[*1]Montfort, Healy, McGuire & Salley, Garden City, N.Y. (Donald S. Neumann, Jr., ofcounsel), for appellants.

Decolator, Cohen & DiPrisco, LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Joseph L. Decolator, James MadisonKeefe, and David Stanton Gould of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Oscar I. Berrios andMarta T. Berrios appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the SupremeCourt, Queens County (Dollard, J.), entered December 10, 2007, as denied that branch of theirmotion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

A police officer injured in the line of duty seeking to recover under General Municipal Law§ 205-e must "identify a statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply,"and must "set forth facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant's negligence directly orindirectly caused" his or her injuries (Link v City of New York, 34 AD3d 757, 758 [2006]; seeGiuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d 72, 79 [2003]). "Proving that the defendant's violationwas an 'indirect cause' does not require the same amount of proof as proximate cause incommon-law negligence, but requires a practical or reasonable connection between the statutoryor regulatory violation and the injury" (Aldrich v Sampier, 2 AD3d 1101, 1103 [2003]; see Giuffrida vCitibank Corp., 100 NY2d at 81; Williams v City of New York, 256 AD2d 332[1998]). Here, the appellants failed to establish, prima facie, the lack of connection between thestatutory violation at issue and the plaintiff's injuries (see Aldrich v Sampier, 2 AD3d at1103; cf. Kenavan v City of New York, 267 AD2d 353, 356 [1999]). Accordingly, [*2]that branch of the appellants' motion which was for summaryjudgment dismissing the second cause of action, which alleged that they are liable under GeneralMunicipal Law § 205-e, was properly denied regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff'sopposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853[1985]). Mastro, J.P., Dillon, Covello and Dickerson, JJ., concur.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.