Pinto v Metropolitan Opera
2009 NY Slip Op 03498 [61 AD3d 949]
April 28, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 10, 2009


Jacqueline Pinto, Appellant,
v
Metropolitan Opera et al.,Respondents.

[*1]Russo, Scamardella & D'Amato P.C., Staten Island, N.Y. (Michael V. Gervasi ofcounsel), for appellant.

Katz & Rychik, New York, N.Y. (Abe M. Rychik and Andrew Fluger of counsel), forrespondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Richmond County (McMahon, J.), dated January 18, 2008, which grantedthe defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she slipped and fell on an accumulation of water atthe foot of a staircase in the Metropolitan Opera House, which is owned by the defendantLincoln Center for the Performing Arts, Inc., and operated by the defendant Metropolitan Opera.She subsequently commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries. Thedefendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that theydid not create the alleged hazardous condition and did not have actual or constructive noticethereof. The plaintiff opposed the motion, contending, among other things, that the defendantshad notice of a recurring condition of water being "tracked-in" from outside by patrons duringinclement weather, permitting an inference of constructive notice, and that the defendants failedto take reasonable measures to abate the alleged accumulation of water. The Supreme Courtgranted the defendants' motion. We affirm.

In this slip-and-fall case, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment[*2]as a matter of law by presenting sufficient evidence todemonstrate that they neither created the alleged dangerous condition nor had actual orconstructive notice thereof for a sufficient length of time for their employees to have discoveredand remedied it (see Sloane v CostcoWholesale Corp., 49 AD3d 522, 522 [2008]; Frazier v City of New York, 47 AD3d 757, 758 [2008]; Prusak v New York City Hous. Auth.,43 AD3d 1022, 1022-1023 [2007]; Gullo-Georgio v Dunkin' Donuts Inc., 38 AD3d 836, 836-837[2007]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The evidence submittedby the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the accumulation of waterexisted for a period of time sufficient to impute constructive notice to the defendants (see Perlongo v Park City 3 & 4 Apts., Inc.,31 AD3d 409, 411 [2006]; Yearwood v Cushman & Wakefield, 294 AD2d 568,569 [2002]). Moreover, assuming that the defendants were aware that water on the floor was arecurring condition in rainy or snowy weather, proof that the defendants were aware of thisgeneral condition would not be sufficient to establish constructive notice of the particular wetcondition which allegedly caused the plaintiff to slip and fall (see Perlongo v Park City 3 & 4Apts., Inc., 31 AD3d at 411; Rogersv Rockefeller Group Intl., Inc., 38 AD3d 747, 750 [2007]; Yearwood v Cushman &Wakefield, 294 AD2d at 569). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted thedefendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Mastro, J.P., Dillon,Covello and Dickerson, JJ., concur.


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