Narvaez v New York City Hous. Auth.
2009 NY Slip Op 03615 [62 AD3d 419]
May 5, 2009
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 1, 2009


Yesenia Narvaez, an Infant, by Her Guardian, Ruth Osorio, et al.,Appellants,
v
New York City Housing Authority,Respondent.

[*1]Raymond Schwartzberg & Associates, PLLC, New York (Raymond B. Schwartzberg ofcounsel), for appellants.

Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP, New York (John Sandercock of counsel), forrespondent.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Stanley Green, J.), entered June 17, 2008, whichgranted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimouslyaffirmed, without costs.

Infant plaintiff was allegedly injured when the elevator door closed too quickly, causing herhead to be pinched by the closing door. Defendant New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA)demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law by showingthere had been no prior complaints about this condition prior to the accident. Evidenceestablished that NYCHA, which serviced the elevator on a regular basis, had recorded noproblems with the elevator door closing too quickly (see Gjonaj v Otis El. Co., 38 AD3d 384 [2007]).

Plaintiffs' opposition papers failed to raise an issue of fact as to the existence of a defect andwhether defendant had actual or constructive notice of it. Plaintiffs failed to submit any experttestimony supporting their contention that the elevator was defective and that such defect causedthe accident. Moreover, on this record, plaintiffs' proof of notice was entirely speculative (see Lapin v Atlantic Realty Apts. Co.,LLC, 48 AD3d 337 [2008]). Neither plaintiffs' deposition testimony nor an affidavit bya neighbor sufficiently established that anyone made any complaint to NYCHA or that NYCHAknew of any complaints concerning the elevator doors. Plaintiffs offered insufficient detail as towhen and how often the elevator door closed too quickly and made unsubstantiated conclusionsthat there were prior accidents involving a similar malfunctioning of the door (seeGjonaj, 38 AD3d at 385).

The circumstances of this case do not warrant the application of the doctrine of res ipsa[*2]loquitur (see Feblot v New York Times Co., 32NY2d 486, 495 [1973]; Parris v Port ofN.Y. Auth., 47 AD3d 460, 461 [2008]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Andrias, Saxe,Moskowitz and DeGrasse, JJ.


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