| Micciche v Micciche |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 03702 [62 AD3d 673] |
| May 5, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| John P. Micciche, Respondent, v Kimberly A. Micciche,Appellant. |
—[*1] Feldman and Feldman, Uniondale, N.Y. (Steven A. Feldman of counsel), forrespondent.
In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated August 23,2002, the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the SupremeCourt, Suffolk County (McNulty, J.), dated March 13, 2008, as granted those branches of theplaintiff's motion which were to require her to pay her pro rata share of unreimbursed medicalexpenses related to psychiatric care and summer camp expenses of the parties' children.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting thatbranch of the plaintiff's motion which was to require the defendant to pay her share ofunreimbursed medical expenses related to psychiatric care, and substituting therefor a provisiondenying that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealedfrom, without costs or disbursements.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly found that summer campexpenses for the children constituted child care expenses within the meaning of DomesticRelations Law § 240 (1-b) (c) (4) (see Sieratzki v Sieratzki, 8 AD3d 552 [2004]; Cohen-Davidsonv Davidson, 255 AD2d 414 [1998]), and directed the defendant to pay a portion of theseexpenses in accordance with her pro rata share of the parties' income.
However, the court erred in requiring the defendant to pay for any portion of unreimbursedpsychiatric expenses. A stipulation of settlement in a matrimonial action is a contract subject tothe principles of contract interpretation (see Rainbow v Swisher, 72 NY2d 106 [1988];Sieratzki v Sieratzki, 8 AD3d552 [2004]; Douglas v Douglas,7 AD3d 481 [2004]; De Luca v De Luca, 300 AD2d 342 [2002]). Thus, wherethe [*2]stipulation is "clear and unambiguous on its face, theintent of the parties must be gleaned from within the four corners of the instrument, and not fromextrinsic evidence" (Rainbow v Swisher, 72 NY2d at 109; Sieratzki v Sieratzki, 8 AD3d 552[2004]). Here, the parties' stipulation unambiguously provided that any psychiatric expenses forthe children had to be agreed upon in writing and that if they were consented to in writing theexpenses would be shared on a pro rata basis. There was no written consent provided by thedefendant. Therefore, the court erred in requiring her to pay any portion of unreimbursedpsychiatric expenses.
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit. Spolzino, J.P., Skelos, Dillon andBelen, JJ., concur.