| Matter of Alexis R. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 03832 [62 AD3d 497] |
| May 14, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| In the Matter of Alexis R., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. AnaR., Appellant; Administration for Children's Services, Respondent. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Sharyn Rootenberg of counsel), forrespondent. Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Mitchell L. Katz of counsel), LawGuardian.
Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Sara P. Schechter, J.), entered on orabout June 15, 2006, which, upon a finding of derivative neglect, released the subject child torespondent subject to the supervision of petitioner Administration for Children's Services,unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, and the petition dismissed.
There is no hard and fast rule governing time proximity in determining whether proof ofneglect of one child may, in appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to sustain a finding of abuseor neglect of a second child (see Matterof Kadiatou B., 52 AD3d 388, 389 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 701 [2009];Matter of Cruz, 121 AD2d 901, 902 [1986]). Here, however, given the evidence thatrespondent has been drug free since she stopped smoking marijuana after she discovered that shewas pregnant, the fact that respondent's parental rights had previously been terminated upon afinding of permanent neglect of her two sons, who were voluntarily placed in foster care in 1998and are now 16 and 13 years old, is insufficient to support a finding that respondent hasneglected her daughter Alexis, who was born in July 2005.
Aside from being remote in time, the prior findings of neglect, unlike the allegations in thisproceeding, were not based upon any drug use by respondent, but were based upon inadequatesupervision and guardianship, namely, her having missed medical appointments regarding oneson's surgery, and her having failed to address her other son's behavioral problems and properlymanage her financial affairs. The court expressed concerns about respondent's decision, inJanuary 2006, to leave the residential treatment program at Odyssey House, which she hadvoluntarily entered in September 2005, two months after her daughter's birth, and move in withher aunt because of dissatisfaction with its program; however, there was testimony by petitioner'schild protective supervisor that she had told respondent that, because she was not [*2]required to be in an inpatient program, she did not have to staythere, so that her plan to reside with her aunt and attend an outpatient program was "fine."Concur—Tom, J.P., Andrias, Nardelli, Catterson and Moskowitz, JJ.