Matter of Marcus v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Wesley Hills
2009 NY Slip Op 03906 [62 AD3d 799]
May 12, 2009
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 1, 2009


In the Matter of Neil Marcus et al., Appellants,
v
Board ofTrustees of Village of Wesley Hills et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Alan McGeorge, Haverstraw, N.Y., for appellants.

Drake, Loeb, Heller, Kennedy, Gogerty, Gaba & Rodd PLLC, New Windsor, N.Y. (StephenJ. Gaba of counsel), for respondent Board of Trustees of Village of Wesley Hills.

Steven Habiague, Poughquag, N.Y., for respondents Ira Wickes and Rockland Tree Expert,Inc.

In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review a determination ofthe Board of Trustees of the Village of Wesley Hills dated June 13, 2006, adopting a resolutionenacting Local Law No. 3 (2006) of the Village of Wesley Hills, which amended the zoning lawto authorize additional special permit uses, and action, among other things, for a judgmentdeclaring that Local Law No. 3 (2006) of the Village of Wesley Hills is null and void, thepetitioners/plaintiffs appeal (1) from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of theSupreme Court, Rockland County (Berliner, J.), dated May 14, 2007, as, in effect, granted thosebranches of the motion of the Board of Trustees of the Village of Wesley Hills and thosebranches of the separate motion of Ira Wickes and Rockland Tree Expert, Inc., doing business asIra Wickes Arborist which were to dismiss the first, seventh, and eighth causes of action insofaras asserted against them as time-barred, the fourth cause of action insofar as asserted againstthem, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and the fifth, sixth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfthcauses of action insofar as asserted against them for failure to state a cause of action, anddismissed those causes of action, and (2), by permission, from so much of an [*2]order of the same court dated December 18, 2007, as, uponreargument, adhered to the original determination.

Ordered that the order and judgment dated May 14, 2007, is modified, on the law, bydeleting the provisions thereof granting those branches of the motion of the Board of Trustees ofthe Village of Wesley Hills and those branches of the separate motion of Ira Wickes andRockland Tree Expert, Inc., doing business as Ira Wickes Arborist, which were to dismiss thefirst, seventh, and eighth causes of action insofar as asserted against them as time-barred and thefourth cause of action insofar as asserted against them pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) anddismissing those causes of action, and substituting therefor a provision denying those branchesof the motions; as so modified, the order and judgment dated May 14, 2007, is affirmed insofaras appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the order dated December 18, 2007, ismodified accordingly; and it is further,

Ordered that the appeal from the order dated December 18, 2007, is dismissed as academicin light of our determination of the appeal from the order and judgment dated May 14, 2007.

Ira Wickes and Rockland Tree Expert, Inc., doing business as Ira Wickes Arborist(hereinafter together Wickes), operate a plant nursery and arborist business on a parcel of realproperty (hereinafter the premises) located in the R-35 zoning district of the Village of WesleyHills. In 2001, the Village Zoning Board of Appeals determined that Wickes' use of the premisesfor arborist use was not a legally established nonconforming use. This Court confirmed thatdetermination in an order dated April 21, 2003 (see Matter of Wickes v Kaplan, 304AD2d 769 [2003]).

At a "special meeting" of the Village's Board of Trustees (hereinafter the Board) on April 26,2004, the Board adopted a resolution approving a proposed stipulation of settlement (hereinafterthe stipulation) in a zoning enforcement proceeding pending in the Village of Wesley HillsJustice Court (hereinafter the Justice Court) based upon charges that Wickes had illegallyexpanded a prior nonconforming use of the premises. Under the terms of the stipulation, whichwas "so ordered" by the Justice Court on September 8, 2004, the Village agreed to dismiss thecharges against Wickes and to refrain from taking "any governmental action" related to Wickes'use of the premises, within certain enumerated limitations, while the Village considered adoptingan amendment to its zoning law to create a new special permit use in the R-35 zoning district. Inthe event the Village determined not to approve the amendment, or if the Village adopted theamendment but the Village Planning Board denied Wickes' application for a special permitthereunder, Wickes would be required to wind up business operations at the premises.

At a meeting on June 13, 2006, the Board adopted a resolution enacting Local Law No. 3(2006) of the Village of Wesley Hills (hereinafter the Local Law). The Local Law amended thevillage zoning law by adding "Arborist Services, Landscape Services, and/or WholesaleNurseries" as a special permit use within the R-35 zoning district. The Village filed the LocalLaw with the office of the Secretary of State on July 3, 2006.

On October 27, 2006, the petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners), all of whom ownresidential real property near the premises, commenced this hybrid proceeding and actionseeking, inter alia, CPLR article 78 review and declaratory relief based upon their procedural andsubstantive challenges to the Board's determination to enter into the stipulation and its enactmentof the Local Law. The Board and Wickes separately moved to dismiss the petition/complaint,arguing, among [*3]other things, that the causes of action thereinwere time-barred and/or that the petition/complaint failed to state a cause of action. In an orderand judgment dated May 14, 2007, the Supreme Court granted certain branches of theirrespective motions and dismissed 10 of the 12 causes of action set forth in thepetition/complaint. Upon reargument, the Supreme Court adhered to its original determination.We modify.

We agree with the Supreme Court that the petitioners failed to state a cause of action underthe tenth cause of action, albeit for a different reason. Under the tenth cause of action, thepetitioners alleged that the Board had granted Wickes a "de facto variance" through thestipulation in excess of its jurisdiction. In support of this claim, the petitioners alleged that thestipulation had permitted Wickes to continue his illegal arborist activities at the premises inviolation of the village zoning law. However, while the allegations in a complaint are to beaccepted as true when considering a motion to dismiss, "factual claims flatly contradicted bydocumentary evidence are not entitled to any such consideration" (Dinerman v Jewish Bd. of Family &Children's Servs., Inc., 55 AD3d 530, 531 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]).Here, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, the terms of the stipulation did not giveWickes permission to violate the village zoning law (cf. Matter of Buckley v Town of Wappinger, 12 AD3d 597, 598[2004]; Town of Smithtown v Haynes, 278 AD2d 312, 313-314 [2000]).

However, contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the eighth cause of action, allegingthat the Board violated the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8, hereinafterSEQRA) in enacting the Local Law, was not time-barred. "[A] proceeding alleging SEQRAviolations in the enactment of legislation must be commenced within four months of the date ofenactment of the ordinance" (Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d193, 200 [1987]; see Matter of Sterling Concerned Citizens v Pell, 204 AD2d 730, 731[1994]). Additionally, Municipal Home Rule Law § 27 (3) provides that"[n]otwithstanding the effective date of any local law, a local law shall not become effectivebefore it is filed in the office of the secretary of state." Applying these principles to the instantmatter (see Matter of Sterling Concerned Citizens v Pell, 204 AD2d at 731), the LocalLaw was not enacted until July 3, 2006, when the Village filed it with the Secretary of State.Since the petitioners commenced this proceeding on October 27, 2006, less than four monthslater, the eighth cause of action was not time-barred. For the same reason, the first and seventhcauses of action, raising challenges to the enactment of the Local Law pursuant to CPLR article78, were also timely under the four-month statute of limitations applicable to CPLR article 78proceedings (see CPLR 217 [1]).

The Supreme Court erred in concluding that the fourth cause of action should be dismissedpursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1). Under the fourth cause of action, the petitioners alleged that theBoard failed to comply with General Municipal Law § 239-m (6) in enacting the LocalLaw. Under General Municipal Law § 239-m (6), where a municipality has referred aproposed zoning action to a county planning agency for review (see General MunicipalLaw § 239-m [2], [3], [4]), "[w]ithin thirty days after final action, the referring body shallfile a report of the final action it has taken with the county planning agency" (General MunicipalLaw § 239-m [6]). Here, the Board submitted evidence that it sent the proposed Local Lawto the Rockland County Department of Planning before adopting the resolution to enact it.However, neither the Board nor Wickes proffered any documentary evidence that the Villagecomplied with the filing requirement of General Municipal Law § 239-m (6) (seeCPLR 3211 [a] [1]).

The petitioners' remaining contentions are without merit. Miller, J.P., Angiolillo, Eng andAustin, JJ., concur.


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