| Lauria v Downey-Goodlein El. Corp. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 04497 [63 AD3d 1561] |
| June 5, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Cynthia M. Lauria, Respondent, v Downey-GoodleinElevator Corp. et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Goergen and Manson, Williamsville (Joseph G. Goergen, II, of counsel), fordefendant-appellant LAM Associates. Brenna, Brenna & Boyce, PLLC, Rochester (Sheldon W. Boyce of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.
Appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (William P. Polito, J.), enteredJuly 22, 2008 in a personal injury action. The order granted plaintiff's motion to set aside the juryverdict with respect to proximate cause and directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff and againstdefendants on proximate cause.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the lawwithout costs, the motion is denied and the verdict with respect to proximate cause is reinstated.
Memorandum: Plaintiff, Cynthia M. Lauria, commenced this action seeking damages forinjuries she sustained when the elevator in which she was riding stopped abruptly. The elevatorwas located in a building owned by defendant LAM Associates (LAM), and LAM contractedwith defendant Downey-Goodlein Elevator Corp. (Downey-Goodlein) to service and repair theelevator. Following a jury trial on liability, the jury found that Downey-Goodlein was negligentbut that its negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff thereafter moved toset aside the verdict in favor of defendants with respect to proximate cause and for judgmentnotwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial on the issue of proximate cause. Weconclude that Supreme Court erred in granting what it characterized as "[p]laintiff's motion. . . for a directed verdict on proximate cause." We agree with defendants thatplaintiff is not entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, indeed, a directed verdict,inasmuch as she "failed to establish that 'there [was] no rational process by which the [jury]could base a finding in favor of [Downey-Goodlein,] the nonmoving party' " (Leonard vThompson & Johnson Equip. Co., Inc. [appeal No. 2], 60 AD3d 1302, 1303 [2009], quotingSzczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]). Nor can it be said that plaintiff is entitledto a new trial on the issue of proximate cause.
"A jury finding that a party was negligent but that such negligence was not a proximatecause of the accident is inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence only when the issuesare 'so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without alsofinding proximate cause' " (Cona v Dwyer, 292 AD2d 562, 563 [2002]; seeSkowronski v Mordino, 4 [*2]AD3d 782, 783 [2004]), andthat is not the case here. In any event, "[w]here . . . 'an apparently inconsistent orillogical verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party isentitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view' " (Mascia v Olivia, 299 AD2d883, 883 [2002]; see Lemberger v City of New York, 211 AD2d 622, 623 [1995]).Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Fahey, Carni and Pine, JJ.