| Kann v Maggies Paratransit Corp. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 04864 [63 AD3d 792] |
| June 9, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Yvonne Kann, Appellant, v Maggies Paratransit Corp. etal., Defendants, and Ann F. Lamberson, Respondent. (And a Third-PartyAction.) |
—[*1] Cheng & Associates, PLLC, Long Island City, N.Y. (Pui Chi Cheng of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by herbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Weiss, J.), dated March7, 2008, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Ann F. Lamberson which was forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured when the minibus in which she was a passenger collidedwith a vehicle owned and operated by the defendant Ann F. Lamberson. As a result, the plaintiffcommenced this action against Lamberson, the minibus driver, and his employer, who was theowner of the minibus. Lamberson then commenced a third-party action against the driver of theminibus, the minibus owner, and the New York City Transit Authority. Thereafter, Lambersonmoved for summary judgment contending, inter alia, that the alleged negligence of the minibusdriver was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The Supreme Court granted the motion onthat ground. We affirm.
Lamberson established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, byproviding evidence that she entered the intersection with the right-of-way, and that the minibusdriver violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141 when he made a left turn into the path ofher vehicle without yielding the right-of-way (see Palomo v Pozzi, 57 AD3d 498 [2008]; Spivak v Erickson, 40 AD3d 962,963 [2007]; Carabella v Saad, 29AD3d 618, 619 [2006]; Morebackv Mesquita, 17 AD3d 420, 421 [2005]; Torro v Schiller, 8 AD3d 364, 364-365 [2004]; Rieman vSmith, 302 AD2d 510 [2003]). As the driver with the right-of-way, Lamberson was entitledto anticipate that the driver of the minibus would obey the traffic laws which required theminibus to yield (see Palomo v Pozzi, 57 AD3d at 498; Spivak v Erickson, 40AD3d at 962; Aristizabal v Aristizabal,37 AD3d 503, 504 [2007]; Moreback v Mesquita, 17 AD3d at 421; Jacino v Sugerman, 10 AD3d 593,595 [2004]).[*2]
In opposition, the plaintiff's contention that Lamberson'sspeed, described by the minibus driver as approximately 35 to 40 miles per hour, wasunreasonable, is wholly conclusory and fails on this record to raise a triable issue of fact (see McCain v Larosa, 41 AD3d792, 793 [2007]; Rieman v Smith, 302 AD2d 510, 510-511 [2003]).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Angiolillo, Dickersonand Eng, JJ., concur.