| Waldman v LDK Realty, Inc. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 04894 [63 AD3d 828] |
| June 9, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Stuart Waldman, Appellant-Respondent, v LDK Realty,Inc., et al., Respondents-Appellants. |
—[*1] John Z. Marangos (Harold J. Siegel, Staten Island, N.Y., of counsel), forrespondents-appellants.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of a contract for the sale of realproperty and for specific performance of that contract, the plaintiff appeals from stated portionsof an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (McMahon, J.), entered February 19, 2008,which, inter alia, in effect, upon the plaintiff's application, searched the record and awarded himsummary judgment on the complaint only to the extent of directing the defendants to removecertain hazardous substances located on the real property or return the down payment to himimmediately, and the defendants cross-appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of thesame order as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and on thecounterclaim declaring that they are entitled to retain the down payment and, in effect, upon theplaintiff's application, searched the record and awarded him summary judgment on the complaintto the extent of directing them to remove the hazardous substances located on the real propertyor return the down payment to him immediately.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provision thereof denyingthat branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion, and (2) bydeleting the provision thereof, in effect, upon the plaintiff's application, searching the record andawarding him summary judgment on the complaint to the extent of directing the defendants toremove the hazardous substances located on the real property or return the down payment to himimmediately and substituting therefor a provision, upon the plaintiff's application, searching therecord and awarding him summary judgment on the defendants' counterclaim declaring that thedefendants are not entitled to retain the down payment, and directing the defendants to return thedown payment to him to the extent of depositing the down payment with the Richmond CountyClerk for the purpose of disbursing the down payment to the plaintiff; as so modified, the orderis affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and thematter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Richmond County, for the entry of a judgment, interalia, declaring that the defendants are not entitled to retain the down payment.
On November 21, 2005 the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendants to [*2]purchase certain real property they owned in Staten Island, and hetendered them a down payment. The contract recited that, "to the best of Seller's knowledge,"there were no hazardous substances on the property. It further provided a time period(hereinafter the revocation period) during which the plaintiff had the right to conduct an"environmental inspection" and to terminate the contract for any reason and be entitled to thereturn of the down payment. The contract also specified a closing date. The plaintiff did notdiscover any hazardous substances on the property and did not elect to terminate the contractduring the revocation period. Both parties allowed the closing date to pass without protest.
Several months later, the plaintiff informed the defendants that he had discovered thathazardous substances existed on the property. The defendants replied that the period forreporting such a problem had expired. A few months after that, the defendants informed theplaintiff by letter that they had satisfied all of their obligations and notified him that the closingdate would be April 20, 2007. The letter recited that time was of the essence. In response, theplaintiff raised certain title objections, and the defendants adjourned the closing in order to curethe objections.
Several days later, the plaintiff commenced this action for specific performance and torecover damages for breach of contract. The plaintiff also sought to recover damages for tortiousinterference with contract and an award of an attorney's fee. In their answer, the defendantsasserted a counterclaim seeking a judgment declaring that the plaintiff had breached the contractand that they were therefore entitled to retain his down payment as liquidated damages.
The defendants thereafter moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and on thecounterclaim. The plaintiff opposed the motion and requested, in his opposition papers, that thecourt search the record and award him summary judgment on both the complaint and thedefendants' counterclaim. The plaintiff argued, primarily, that he was entitled to specificperformance of the contract with an abatement in the contract price if the defendants did notremove the hazardous substances from the property.
The Supreme Court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint and on the counterclaim and, in effect, upon the plaintiff's application, searched therecord and awarded him summary judgment on the complaint, but only to the extent of directingthe defendants to remove the hazardous substances within 120 days or return the down paymentto the plaintiff. We modify.
The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law withrespect to the cause of action for specific performance. The plaintiff was not entitled to specificperformance with an abatement of the purchase price, inasmuch as the contract did not providefor that relief upon the discovery of hazardous substances on the property (see Arker Cos. v New York State UrbanDev. Corp., 47 AD3d 739 [2008]; 101123 LLC v Solis Realty LLC, 23 AD3d 107, 112, 113 [2005]);it provided only that if the plaintiff raised objections during the revocation period, he couldcancel the contract and recover his down payment. Moreover, the defendants made a prima facieshowing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the plaintiff's remainingcauses of action to recover damages for breach of contract and tortious interference withcontract, as well as for an award of an attorney's fee (see Zuckerman v City of NewYork, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Since the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact inopposition to the defendants' showing, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of thedefendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Israel v Charnews, 46 AD3d753, 755 [2007]).
Upon the plaintiff's application, the Supreme Court should have searched the record andawarded summary judgment to the plaintiff on the defendants' counterclaim. The plaintiff did notbreach the contract, and the defendants were thus not entitled to retain his down payment asliquidated damages (see Singh vGopaul, 43 AD3d 1145, 1146 [2007]). Even if the plaintiff failed to timely raise hisobjections to title based on the discovery of hazardous substances on the real property after theexpiration of the revocation period, the defendants continued to treat the contract as valid byadjourning the closing for a reasonable time to cure any defects in title (see Singh vGopaul, 43 AD3d at 1145-1146; Inter-Power of N.Y. v Niagara Mohawk PowerCorp., 259 AD2d 932, 934 [1999]).[*3]
Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, thematter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Richmond County, for the entry of a judgment,inter alia, declaring that the defendants are not entitled to retain the contract down payment asliquidated damages (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], appealdismissed 371 US 74 [1962], cert denied 371 US 901 [1962]).
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit. Fisher, J.P., Dickerson, Eng and Hall,JJ., concur.