| Zdenek v Safety Consultants, Inc. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 05116 [63 AD3d 918] |
| June 16, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Henry Zdenek, Jr., et al., Respondents, v Safety Consultants, Inc.,et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] John D. Randazzo, Hawthorne, N.Y., for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal from anorder of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cohalan, J.), dated April 30, 2008, which deniedtheir motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
The plaintiff Henry Zdenek, Jr. (hereinafter the plaintiff), was injured when his motorcyclestruck the rear of a van owned and operated by the defendants on an entrance ramp to the LongIsland Expressway. At his deposition, the defendant driver testified that he had slowed downprior to the accident in anticipation of a traffic light which controlled traffic merging from theentrance ramp onto the expressway. In contrast, the plaintiff claims that the defendant driveractually came to a sudden and complete stop without signaling, and that the stop wasunnecessary because the subject traffic light was not in operation at the time of the accident.However, the plaintiff admitted at his deposition that he was five to six car lengths behind thedefendants' van when he observed that it had come to a stop. The Supreme Court denied thedefendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and we reverse.
A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case ofnegligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on the operatorto rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision(see Jumandeo v Franks, 56 AD3d 614 [2008]; Arias v Rosario, 52 AD3d 551,552 [2008]; Hakakian v McCabe, 38 AD3d 493 [2007]). "A claim that the driver of thelead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption ofnegligence" (Jumandeo v Franks, 56 AD3d 614, 615 [2008] [internal quotation marksomitted]; see Arias v Rosario, 52 AD3d 551, 552 [2008]; Lundy v Llatin, 51AD3d 877, 878 [2008]).
Here, the defendants made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matterof law by submitting evidence that their van was struck in the rear by the plaintiff's motorcycle(see Arias v Rosario, 52 AD3d 551, 552 [2008]; Harrington v Kern, 52 AD3d473 [2008]; Ahmad v Grimaldi, 40 AD3d [*2]786[2007]). Although the plaintiff claims that the defendants' van came to a sudden stop, histestimony that he was five to six car lengths behind the van when the stop occurred, but wasnevertheless unable to safely stop his motorcycle behind the van, indicates that he was travelingat an excessive rate of speed for an entrance ramp merging onto an expressway (see Barile vLazzarini, 222 AD2d 635, 636 [1995]). Under these circumstances, the assertion that thedefendants' van came to a sudden stop was insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligencecreated by the rear-end collision, and raise a triable issue of fact to defeat summary judgment(see Jumandeo v Franks, 56 AD3d 614, 615 [2008]; Arias v Rosario, 52 AD3d551, 552 [2008]; Harrington v Kern, 52 AD3d 473 [2008]; Lundy v Llatin, 51AD3d 877, 878 [2008]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635, 636 [1995]). Mastro, J.P.,Florio, Eng and Leventhal, JJ., concur.