| People v Hendrix |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 05153 [63 AD3d 958] |
| June 16, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v TroyHendrix, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Ruth E. Ross ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Tomei, J.),rendered April 11, 2006, as amended by a judgment of the same court rendered May 31, 2006,convicting him of murder in the first degree (two counts), kidnapping in the first degree (twocounts), rape in the first degree, and sodomy in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, andimposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment, as amended, is affirmed.
The right to be present in the courtroom during one's trial is one of the most basic rightsguaranteed by the Federal and New York Constitutions, and by state law (see US Const6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6; CPL 260.20, 340.50; Illinois v Allen, 397 US337, 338 [1970]; People v Williams, 85 NY2d 945, 947 [1995]; People v Parker,57 NY2d 136 [1982]). However, that right may be waived (see People v Parker, 57NY2d at 139), and a defendant may forfeit his right to be present when his conduct"unambiguously indicates a defiance of the processes of law and it disrupts the trial after allparties are assembled and ready to proceed" (People v Sanchez, 65 NY2d 436, 444[1985]).
At the first jury trial of the defendant and his codefendant, while the jury was exiting thecourtroom, the defendant suddenly leapt onto the defense table, and proceeded towards thebench. A court officer intercepted the defendant and a struggle ensued. The Supreme Courtobserved the defendant and the codefendant to be in possession of two handmade knives. Duringthe struggle, the defendant attempted to gain possession of a court officer's firearm. Meanwhile,the codefendant, who was armed, struck his own counsel in the face, causing injury. A numberof court officers were injured during the melee. After the trial court granted a mistrial, thedefendant, over his counsel's objection, was excluded from the second jury trial.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that heforfeited his statutory and constitutional rights to be present at his trial. The Supreme Courtprovidently exercised its discretion in directing that he was to participate in his trial through theuse of audio and video transmissions. Considering, among other things, the violent nature of adefendant's conduct, the Supreme Court was not obligated to afford the defendant an opportunityto attend the second trial with a warning [*2]that any disruptiveconduct would result in his removal from the courtroom (see People v Wilkins, 33 AD3d409, 410 [2006]; see also Lettley v Walsh, 2007 WL 4590019, 2007 US Dist LEXIS93510 [ED NY 2007]). Mastro, J.P., Florio, Eng and Leventhal, JJ., concur. [See 12Misc 3d 447 (2006).]