| Matter of Ayame O.-M. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 05345 [63 AD3d 1069] |
| June 23, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Ayame O.-M. Orange County Department ofSocial Services, Respondent; Leneaka O., Appellant, et al., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 1.) Inthe Matter of Ayria O.-M. Orange County Department of Social Services, Respondent; LeneakaO., Appellant, et al., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 2.) |
—[*1] David Darwin, County Attorney, Goshen, N.Y. (Peter R. Schwartz of counsel), forpetitioner-respondent. Ronna L. DeLoe, Mamaroneck, N.Y., attorney for the children.
In two related proceedings pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b and Family CourtAct article 6 to terminate parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect, the mother appealsfrom an order of disposition of the Family Court, Orange County (Bivona, J.), entered May 16,2008, which, after a hearing, revoked a suspended judgment of the same court entered October13, 2005, as extended by orders of the same court entered September 18, 2006, and May 30,2007, upon a determination that she violated the terms and conditions thereof, terminated herparental rights, and transferred the custody and guardianship of the subject children to theOrange County Department of Social Services for the purpose of adoption.
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
A suspended judgment is a dispositional alternative upon a finding of permanent neglect(see Family Ct Act §§ 631, 633; Matter of Ernesto Thomas A., 5AD3d 380, 381 [2004]). It affords "a brief grace period designed to prepare the parent to bereunited with the child" and provides the parent "a second chance, where the court determines itis in the child's best interests" (Matter of Michael B., 80 NY2d 299, 311 [1992]). Theparent's opportunity to comply with the terms and conditions of the suspended [*2]judgment is strictly limited to a one-year period, with a second yearonly in the case of "exceptional circumstances" (Family Ct Act § 633 [b]; see Matterof Michael B., 80 NY2d at 311). The Family Court may revoke a suspended judgment if itfinds, by a preponderance of the evidence adduced at a violation hearing, that the parent failed tocomply with one or more of the conditions of the suspended judgment (see Matter of DarrenV., 61 AD3d 986 [2009]; Matter of Michael Phillip T., 44 AD3d 1062 [2007];Matter of Ricky Joseph V., 24 AD3d 683, 684 [2005]; Matter of Aaron S., 15AD3d 585, 586 [2005]). A parent's attempt to comply with the literal provisions of the suspendedjudgment is not sufficient to avoid revocation (see Matter of Darren V., 61 AD3d 986[2009]).
Here, the Family Court, by its order entered October 13, 2005, determined that the subjectchildren were permanently neglected, and suspended judgment for a period of one year, directingthe mother to comply with terms and conditions, including her successful completion of mentalhealth therapy with an attendance rate of 90% of all therapy sessions. Thereafter, by ordersentered September 18, 2006, and May 30, 2007, the Family Court found that the mother hadfailed to comply with this condition and, each time, extended the suspended judgment foranother year. This last extension granted the mother more than she was entitled to pursuant toFamily Court Act § 633 (b). In any event, the Family Court properly determined, by apreponderance of the evidence, that the mother had failed to satisfy this condition during thefinal extension period, based upon the testimony of the mother's therapist that the mother hadattended only 55% to 60% of her therapy sessions and had not successfully completed hertherapy. Thus, the suspended judgment was properly revoked and the mother's parental rightswere properly terminated (see Matter of Darren V., 61 AD3d 986 [2009]; Matter ofMichael Phillip T., 44 AD3d at 1062-1063; Matter of Aaron S., 15 AD3d at 586).
Contrary to the mother's contention, the petitioner was not required to prove that it hadexercised diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship, as the mother had previouslyadmitted that she permanently neglected the subject children (see Matter of Fard SaleemG., 297 AD2d 677, 678 [2002]; see also Matter of Carolyn F., 55 AD3d 832,832-833 [2008]; Matter of Aaron S., 15 AD3d at 586).
Moreover, the record supports the Family Court's determination that termination of themother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children (see Matter of Darren V.,61 AD3d 986 [2009]; Matter of Aaron S., 15 AD3d at 586; Matter of Fard SaleemG., 297 AD2d at 678). Santucci, J.P., Covello, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.